BOOK PRESENTATION: THE LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA, 1998-2012
(Edited by Olivier Dabène. Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2012)

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Compared to other developing areas of the world, twenty-first century Latin America is unique in three ways. The countries of the continent are all democracies, with the notable exception of Cuba, a majority are governed by left-leaning presidents and have experienced robust and enviable rates of growth\(^1\). The traditional ills of Latin America - poverty, inequality and violence - admittedly have not disappeared. However, in a favorable economic climate resulting from a boom in exports of raw materials the region is advancing, inspiring confidence and attracting attention. It provides a striking contrast with the lost decade of the 1980s brought on by the debt crisis as well as with the 1990s when neoliberal policies resulted in devastating social costs.

Can the left take credit for these changes? That is the question addressed by *The Left in Latin America*.\(^2\) To answer requires considerable research and many detailed questions must be addressed. Beyond the clichés and the media’s generalities, has the left been able to deliver the changes it called for during the period of neoliberalism? Specifically, has it been able to make a difference regarding social issues, as one is led to believe by commentators’ praise of Brazil under Luiz Inacia Lula da Silva, better known as Lula? Did it prompt revolutions that returned power to the people while respecting their identities, as certain media claim in the cases of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador? Or is it rather a threat to democracy as opponents of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez claim? Has the left enabled these countries to gain a spot among the winners of globalization? Has it contributed to the advancement of a multi-polar, post-hegemonic, world? Will it endure after the passage of its charismatic leaders?

The countries studied in this work are those considered by the media and specialized literature as being leftist based on the election of a president who claimed to be a leftist at the time of coming to power and during his or her term in office.\(^3\) This decision has two important

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\(^1\) Latin America experienced a half-decade of strong growth: 5.8% in 2004, 4.6% in 2005, 5.6% in 2006, 5.6% in 2007 and 4% in 2008. The crisis had an impact in 2009 (-2%), but growth reappeared in 2010 (6%), 2011 (4.3%) and 2012 (3.7%).

\(^2\) The book is a result of the project "The Left in Latin America" which brought together over a period of two years a groups of scholars and PhD students from Sciences-Po as part of the Political Observatory of Latin America and the Caribbean (OPALC) of the Center for international research (CERI).

\(^3\) Manuel Zelaya of Honduras was elected in the name of the Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH), but later made a shift to the left, which resulted in his being deposed by the military.
implications: the book deals only with governments and not with the left more broadly⁴, and the focus is on the national level even though in some countries the left began its rise to power thanks to victories in municipal elections⁵.

From this standpoint the victory of H. Chavez in Venezuela in 1998 marks the beginning of an impressive series of twenty-four victories by the left in thirteen different countries (Table 1). Only Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama and Columbia, as well as Belize, the Dominican Republic, Surinam and Guyana, were unaffected by this trend. And in 2006 the left came close to winning the presidency in Mexico (where it rules in the capital Mexico City) and in Costa Rica. Thus, only Columbia can be considered an exception, with a left undermined at the national level by recurring and unfounded allegations that it had collaborated with the guerillas.⁶ Elsewhere the left has shown an amazing ability to chalk up victories, whether or not their presidents were reelected. Paraguay and Honduras are noteworthy for being the only countries among the thirteen where the left had only one term in office.

Table 1: The twenty-four leftist victories in presidential elections (1998-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Reelection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Ricardo Lagos</td>
<td>Socialist Party (PSCh)</td>
<td>NO*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva</td>
<td>Workers Party (PT)</td>
<td>YES: 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Nestor Kirchner</td>
<td>Justicialist Party (PJ)</td>
<td>NO**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Tabaré Vázquez</td>
<td>Large Front (FA)</td>
<td>NO*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Evo Morales</td>
<td>Movement toward socialism (MAS)</td>
<td>YES: 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Manuel Zelaya</td>
<td>Liberal Party (PLH)</td>
<td>NO (ousted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Michelle Bachelet</td>
<td>Socialist Party (PSCh)</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Rafael Correa</td>
<td>Country Alliance (AP)</td>
<td>YES : 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Álvaro Colom</td>
<td>National Unity of Hope (UNE)</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Fernando Lugo</td>
<td>Patriotic Alliance for Change (AP)</td>
<td>NO (ousted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>Mauricio Funes</td>
<td>Farabundo Martí Front for National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴ The term Left, broadly defined, includes a larger variety of actors, including social movements. See the article (prescient) by James Petras « Latin America. The resurgence of the Left » New Left Review, 223, May-June 1997.

⁵ Montevideo and Porto Alegre were windows and trampolines for the Frente Amplio in Uruguay and the Workers Party in Brazil in the 1990s.

Viewed over the long term this series of victories is not exceptional given that Latin America is accustomed to waves of political change. The twentieth century witnessed two periods of authoritarian rule (the 1930s and 1960-1970) and two periods of democracy (after the second world war and in the 1980s). It also experienced a massive conversion to neo-liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period the candidates’ programs were remarkably similar, and even those advocating policies associated with social democracy and belonging to the Socialist International, adhered to the «Washington Consensus».

The «pink wave» of the 2000s is not new as a «wave» in the sense of there being similarities between the political developments in different countries. It is new in that it is «pink» or «red», and involves political forces that had been ostracized and repressed for decades, and/or that never pretended to adhere to the principles of representative democracy. In this the elections of Jose Mujica in Uruguay and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil are emblematic. The former had been a member of the Tupamaros Guerillas who took up arms against a democratic regime during the second half of the 1960s. The latter participated in the armed conflict against a military dictatorship. Both were arrested and brutally tortured in the early 1970s.

To evaluate the diversity of experiences of the left, but without getting into an explanation of their rise to power in the 2000s, it is important to keep in mind that the left was the beneficiary of a vote against neo-liberalism more than a vote in favor of its projects. In the 1990s it was initially «outsiders» who harnessed the frustration of the middle class at their

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8 There was no evolution of public opinion in favor of the left, if one believes the political auto-positioning index of Latinobarometros, nor an electoral realignment (see Jason Ross Arnold and David Samuels, “Evidence from public opinion”, in Stven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts (eds), The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, Baltimore Md. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011, p.34.). See also Andy Baker and Kenneth Green, “The Latin American Left’s Mandate”, World Politics 63(1), 2011.
9 This notion was developed to describe politicians who did not come from the political class and whose campaign theme was “antipolitics”. Alberto Fujimori, president of Peru from 1990 to 2000, is one such outsider.
loss of purchasing power and their anger at «traditional» political parties. These «outsiders» lost their credibility by putting in place the same neoliberal policies they had criticized during their campaigns. This opened the way for the left, which appeared free of all compromise with the corrupt political classes and unaffected by the social impact of structural adjustment. In other words the turn to the left in Latin America is first and foremost a swing of the pendulum back towards the center brought about by the economic crisis of the years 1998-2002. The explanation for the many victories of the left in the years 2006-2009 is different - it was a vote in recognition of a most favorable economic climate.

In contrast to the neoliberal wave, the pink wave was not founded on a coherent and homogeneous set of ideas. The Sao Paulo Forum, or the «Buenos Aires Consensus», reestablished the role of the State in promoting development and in the war on poverty and inequality. However, while the left seeks to build a society of solidarity and participation it lacks a road map to get there. Moreover the ideas of the left have not been taken up and promoted by any major entities. Since 2001 global social forums have served as incubators and channels of distribution for the ideas of numerous members of civil society none of whom has ever produced a governmental program. Finally, the reform projects were not defended by multilateral organizations imposing conditionality. The left does not have a uniform concept of «good governance» in the way the neoliberals had. In sum, Marxism has not been replaced.

The diversity of experience among the left in Latin America is due in the first instance to the fact that political projects were developed in response to particular challenges considered priorities. At the end of the 1990s all countries needed to wipe out the «social debt» of poverty and inequality accumulated by the neoliberal governments. Nevertheless, to cite just a few examples, some governments emphasized institutional reorganization, notably the introduction of participatory devices, others the inclusion of native populations, or energy and

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11 See Table 1: The left in power did not lose one election between 2006 and 2009, economic boom years.
12 Since 1990, at the initiative of the Brazilian Workers Party (PT) and the Revolutionary Democratic Party of Mexico (PRD) the Latin American left gathered almost every year to develop a political alternative to neoliberalism.
environmental issues. In this latter area a conflict arose between a «nationalist» left defending resource exploitation and the «green» left defending the environment.\(^{14}\)

The diversity is also due to the environment constraining the leftist projects. This environment is composed of three sets of factors, subjects treated in the various chapters of the book.

First, neo-liberalism’s legacy varies greatly from one country to another. In some, structural adjustment plans were implemented with orthodoxy and brutality. Others proceeded more gradually, incrementally, even via negotiations. Nations with oil wealth were largely spared from the need for structural adjustment. To each situation there is a corresponding reduction in the power of the State. Countries that adopted policies of deregulation have witnessed a significant change in the conduct of economic actors over the past twenty years. Deviating from this path is no easy thing. Thus the return of a government engaged in planning and promoting development is easier in countries such as Ecuador, which adopted only moderate neo-liberalism\(^{15}\) than in Chile, long a pioneer and leader in this regard.

Second, the constraints of internationalization also vary among countries. In Mexico, Central America, Chile, Peru and Colombia neoliberal reforms were set in concrete by the free trade agreements (FTAs) with the US. For these countries the FTAs constitute a «second constitution»\(^{16}\) and are difficult to amend. For example, Daniel Ortega, president of Nicaragua, had his country join the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) but did not withdraw from the FTA with the US. The manner in which these countries integrated into the global economy is also diverse. Many profited from Chinese demand for raw materials. This provided the government with room to maneuver on budgetary issues but also made the country more resource-dependent.

Third, and finally, one must consider the features of the domestic political game. In several cases leftist leaders emerged from the ruins of a party system. H. Chavez of Venezuela is a case in point, as is E. Morales of Bolivia. Some authors see a connection between the

\(^{14}\) See in the book, chapter 4 by Marie-Esther Lacuisse “Ecuador. From a revolution by the people to reform by the people: institutional rationalization or personification of power?”, and chapter 10 by Ana Carolina Gonzalez-Espinoza, "Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela. The left and the continuation of resource extraction projects”.

\(^{15}\) It is worth re-reading the 2002 article by Rafael Corea in which he classifies Ecuador among the Latin American nations with the weakest "index of structural policies". President of Ecuador since 2006, he credits himself with bringing his country out of "the long dark night of neoliberalism" (Revista de la CEPAL, 76, April 2002,p.89-107).

\(^{16}\) The expression comes from Stephen Clarkson in Uncle Sam and Us. Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002.
radicalization of the left and the absence of an institutionalized political party system\textsuperscript{17}. They argue that unchallenged by other powers, charismatic leaders are able to bring their projects to fruition. This theory merits discussion, but there is no doubt that a strong opposition combined with weak parliamentary support (divided governments) compels the left to look for compromise. Relations with social movements must also be taken into account. Many leftist parties grew out of such movements and their assent to power was enabled by the movements’ support. Examples include the Brazilian Workers Party and the Bolivian Movement toward Socialism. The relationship leaders maintain once in power with such groups strongly affects their political room to manoeuvre.

Table 2 provides an indication of the diverse situations facing the left when they came to power. Using three indicators – the extent of neo-liberal reforms\textsuperscript{18}; the degree to which the economy is internationalized; and the domestic political game\textsuperscript{19} - it is possible to locate the countries along a continuum of increasingly limited possibilities. The most favorable situation is that of countries which have undertaken no or few structural reforms, have not become dependent on foreign trade and in which the political system and relations with social movements facilitates governance.

This is not a proposal for a model that will predict a leftist government’s performance based on the conditions existing when it came to power. Many nuances must be taken into account when evaluating the indicators: the exact nature of reforms, the specific features of the internationalization of an economy\textsuperscript{20}, and the nature of relationship between the key political actors and that of protest movements\textsuperscript{21}.

Nevertheless Table 2 and Figure 1 provide an outlook of countries in which structural reforms were deep (Bolivia, Peru, Argentina), or in which there was extensive internationalization.

\textsuperscript{17} Kurt Weyland, Raul Madrid and Wendy Hunter (eds), \textit{Leftist Governments in Latin America, Successes and Shortcomings}, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

\textsuperscript{18} The indicator of structural reforms reflects a country’s evolution in five areas: commerce, finance, taxation, privatization and right to work. See Eduard Lora, \textit{Las reformas estructurales en America Latina: que se ha reformado y como medirlo}, Washington, DC, BID Documento de trabajo 462, 2001.

\textsuperscript{19} The index measures the fragmentation of a party system. A high level signifies an assembly composed of many small parties, which requires the government to forge alliances.

\textsuperscript{20} The contribution of exports to the gross national product (GDP) tells us nothing about the vulnerability of the country to financial crisis or worldwide economic downturn. One must take into account the contents of the export basket. During the 2000s some resource-exporting countries saw their growth pulled strongly upward by global demand (Chinese in particular).

(Honduras, Paraguay, Bolivia) and in which fragmentation was high (Brazil, Chile, Equator). Uruguay and Paraguay are at the extremes of the continuum, signifying that Fernando Lugo in Paraguay in 2008 faced far greater constraints than did Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay in 2003. Each country is characterized by a unique configuration affected not only by the nature and extent of the challenges faced but also by the government’s political projects, notably their reform agendas and the sense of urgency placed on them, and by the numerous limitations they faced.

Table 2: Constrains affecting leftist governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country/President</th>
<th>Structural reform index in 1999</th>
<th>Degree of economic openness</th>
<th>Index of partisan fragmentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Venezuela/Hugo Chávez</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Chile/ Ricardo Lagos</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Brazil/Lula</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Argentina/Nestor Kirchner</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Uruguay/ Tabaré Vázquez</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Bolivia/Evo Morales</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Honduras/Manuel Zelaya</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Nicaragua/Daniel Ortega</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ecuador/ Rafael Correa</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Guatemala/ Álvaro Colom</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Paraguay/ Fernando Lugo</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Salvador/Mauricio Funes</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Peru/Ollanta Humala</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Structural reforms: Eduardo Lora, Las reformas estructurales en América latina: qué se ha reformado y cómo medirlo, Washington (D. C.), BID, Documento de trabajo 462, 2001; Economic openness (exports to GDP): World Bank; Partisan fragmentation: author’s elaborations.

Figure 1: Constrains affecting leftist governments

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22 Which seems to have been confirmed by the coup d'Etat of which Lugo was a victim on June 22, 2012.
The book shows that compared to their proclaimed ambitions, and with many nuances of course, the extent of change brought about by the rise to power of the left remains modest. They are however not negligible and may even prove to be profound and enduring over the longer term. This is why the best description of the impact of leftist governments in Latin America may be incremental change with transformative capacity. The relative modesty of the impact can best be explained by the three broad categories of constraints mentioned above: legacy of neo-liberalism, external constraints and domestic politics. The transformative capacity of those changes comes from the importance the Latin American left places on the State as an instrument of governance. In contrast to neoliberal precepts, the left refocused politics back onto social relationships, but did so without bringing into question the market economy. This change was facilitated by the fact that neo-liberalism had lost credibility. It is necessary, however, to recognize that the change occurred in a favorable economic context and by charismatic personalities able to

impose their political authority on the market and to advocate for general over private interests.

The recognition of a role for the State did not return Latin America to the “developmentalist era” of the 1950s and 1960s. The State is no longer a major economic actor even in countries that undertook significant nationalization. Governments are no longer protectionist, but advocates of liberal trade\textsuperscript{24}. The State is no longer obsessed by industrialization, seeking rather to profit from global demand for the natural resources in which Latin America is well endowed. It is a “neo-developmentalist” model, borrowing some tools such as central planning from the old model.

In sum, the Latin American left did not bring about a brutal break with the neo-liberal era. Its actions were not guided by a new post-neoliberal ideology but rather by pragmatism, pushing the consensus view forward in many areas. Three of these areas are worth noting.

First, in the area of economics and social issues, the consensus was that it was necessary to reinforce the powers of the State to boost growth with a view towards wealth redistribution. The electoral campaigns provide an opportunity to evaluate the progress of this consensus. Candidates from the right were often lacking in alternative proposals and were careful not to denigrate the social programs introduced by the left which helped it chalk up numerous electoral victories. At most the right criticized the use of social expenditures to buy support, but without questioning the public policy or its objectives.

Second, a lasting imprint was made by the left in the area of international politics. Latin America has undeniably gained autonomy, thanks to the diverse images projected internationally such as the seductive and moderate Brazil under Lula, the economic pragmatism of the Chilean Concertacion and the more radical path of Venezuela and its ALBA partners. In 2012 the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) is representative of this consensus, which had been missing in Latin America since the end of the 1960s.

Finally, the left worked towards a consensus on the subject of defense of democracy. In this area there is, however, a certain ambiguity. Countries ruled by the more radical left are more inclined to seek to deepen democracy in the participatory sense and to endow

\textsuperscript{24} Some governments do nevertheless have protectionist reflexes (Argentina, Equator). Moreover, there is a debate as to whether free trade is a favorable option for the market or a concept centered on the “people”.

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regional organizations with strong democratic clauses. At the same time, however, they are guilty of violating true democratic principles by restricting the public’s freedoms or cheating during electoral campaigns.

In the three areas discussed - economic and social policies, international politics, and defense of democracy - the left has followed in the path of its predecessors. The paradoxical legacy of the left’s rise to power may be a Latin America increasingly based on consensus. While it spent a great deal of effort to invent an alternative to neoliberalism during the Forums of Sao Paulo or the World Social Forum, in the end the left has proved to be pragmatic and has adapted itself to the environment of the global economy.
Summaries of the chapters

1. Brazil. A deceptive political renewal? Frederic Louault
With the successive elections of Lula (2002, 2006) and then of Dilma Rousseff (2010) as president of the Republic, the 2000s seem to have been a turning point in the political history of Brazil. An historically important leader of the Workers Party (PT), Lula represents the political emergence of the social sectors which had previously been relegated to the margins of the decision-making apparatus. While assuming the political legacy of Lula, Dilma Rousseff feminized political life. Lula and Dilma became symbols of political renewal, of a break with the classical ways of recruiting political leaders. Do their elections really reflect a fundamental change towards greater openness in the political profession? Does the performance of these «figures of change» not contribute to a mirage of renewal? This chapter shows that recruitment of elites evolves slowly, gradually. Despite rapid changes there is in fact little renewal among the political personalities in Brazil and the political game is running out of oxygen.

2. Mexico. When the left «governs» without governing. The phantom cabinet. Helene Combes
In Mexico, despite the entrenched power of the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) in Mexico City and in its more populated suburbs, the left did not win the presidential election. Thus, Mexico did not participate in the red or pink wave, which swept the continent at the end of the 1990s. This chapter deals with the management of the defeat by the leftist candidate in 2006, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, a candidate who almost won the presidency. In November 2006, following a postelection conflict, he established a «legitimate government», and set himself the goal of figuring out how to ensure a place for his «presidency» in the public debate at the national level and in the internal competition among the Mexican left, and specifically within the PRD.

3. Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Columbia. «TV- presidents » or « Media activists of the left »? Erica Guevara
The arrival on the media scene of dynamic presidents seeking increased regulation of the media led to direct confrontation and a polarization of opinions in a true «media war». This chapter argues that the left upset the traditional relationship between governments and the media in the region. This change does not concern the most visible area, that of «a new
model of direct presidential communication ». The novelty was rather in the will of various leftist governments to engage in the long and controversial process of reforming the sector. This chapter explores three aspects of the relationship between leftist governments and the media: The context inherited from their predecessors, their political communications, and their intervention into the radio and telecommunications sectors. Three cases are examined: Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. One case involving the right offers a basis for comparison: that of Columbia.

4. **Ecuador. From a revolution by the people to reform for the people : Rationalization of institutions or personification of power ?** Marie-Esther Lacuisse
Ecuador lived through the overthrow of three presidents and the dollarization of its economy in less than a decade (1997-2005). The citizens’ revolution led by Rafael Correa from the start of his first term in 2006 opened new horizons for the country by proposing constitutional reforms and policies to put an end to the institutional crisis. A new constitution was adopted in 2008. The citizens’ revolution was different from the leftist Latin American governments in that it made citizen participation a forth power and it targeted the rationalization of institutions to improve public policies. The citizens’ revolution created conflicts that went beyond those of the socialist ideology of the 21st century and the majority-rule adopted by the new regime. It called into question the evolution from a revolution of the people to a centralized regime. In Ecuador, the president is key in the reform process. This fact is not new but Rafael Correa seeks to impose on a divided nation a project of national unity that goes beyond the program of the left.

5. **Bolivia. The autonomous illusion of MAS-IPS : the left between decolonization of the state to political patronage.** Veronica Calvo and David Recondo
The new Bolivian constitution of 2009 created a pluri-national state founded on a regime of autonomous regional and « indigenous peasant » departments. The latter was a major innovation of the Bolivian regime. It meets a demand of the Indian movement dating from the 1960s. President Evo Morales and the leaders of his party, the Movement towards Socialism (MAS), took up the political project of the Peasant-Indian organizations which supported the MAS during the presidential and legislative elections of 2005. The autonomous indigenous people project reveals a duality in the political strategy of the government and the MAS: Evo Morales and most of his collaborators and supporters are convinced of the legitimacy of autonomy and its ability to « decolonize » the state. But, confronted with electoral challenges
at the local level the leaders of the MAS oppose a form of government which risks limiting their influence on local affairs.

6. Managing the legacy of the neoliberal state: the left and independent regulators. Pierre Louis Mayaux and Antoine Mailla

The rise to power of the left in Latin America raised the possibility that the status of independent regulatory agencies would be reviewed. These agencies were a central element of the neoliberal reforms put in place by previous leaders. However, this chapter shows, based on a study of Bolivia under the MAS, Brazil under the PT and Chile under the Concertacion, that the attitudes of leftist governments in this area were very diverse. While the government of Evo Morales incorporated these new agencies into the traditional bureaucracy, the Concertacion actually increased their autonomy. The Lula government, on the offensive at the start of its reign, was either unable or unwilling to change the agencies status. These different paths can be explained by a combination of ideological, institutional and special interest factors in each country.

7. Venezuela. The bet on democratizing democracy through participatory social policies. Johanna Levy

Emblematic of public action in Venezuela, the project for participatory democracy constitutes one of the principle elements of the « 21st century Socialism » advocated by Hugo Chavez. The social policies of the « Bolivarian missions » have the dual objective of satisfying the needs of the most deprived sectors of the population as well as contributing to the « redistribution of power » in their favor and to political democratization. A decade after the launch of the first Bolivarian missions their implementation is symptomatic of the progress and the contradictions of the Bolivarian process. An example in the health sector is the mission Barrio Adentro. Challenging the capacity for institutional change in the government, it illustrates the power of active public participation in terms of mobilization and citizen organization.

8. El Salvador. The FMLN in power or the difficulty of inventing leftist security. Louise Bosetti, Nordin Lazreg

The culmination of the rise to power of the left in El Salvador after the civil war of 1992, the victory of the FMLN in the presidential elections of 2009 marks a turning point in a country historically governed by the right. Confronted with serious problem of criminal violence and delinquency the previous right-wing governments are best remembered for their much-
criticized adoption of repressive security policies (*manodurismo*). Does the rise to power of Mauricio Funes signal a change in public policy in the area of criminality? We see that at the national level the FMLN was not able to root out the repressive security apparatus still dominant in El Salvador and the rest of Latin America. While the local level in El Salvador may be a laboratory for innovation in the area of public security, the *seguridad ciudadana* is not unique to leftist municipalities.

9. **The Latin American Left facing the challenges of the past.** Delphine Lecombe

The election of leftist governments in Latin America brought to power leaders who had suffered from dictatorial repression. Yet this did not lead to former leaders being held responsible for past human rights violations nor to the legal pursuit of those who engaged in torture. The status of “victims’ right to justice and truth” varies among states. The distinction between “right” and “left” does not explain the changes that occurred (or failed to occur) in Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina or Peru. The actions related to the past taken by Latin American governments are best explained by two factors: the game plans of those at the heart of the government and the extent to which political and legal leaders endorsed international norms.

10. **Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela. The left and the continuation of the resource extraction project.** Ana Carolina Gonzalez

The arrival in power of the left in the Andes brought about important changes in the management of non-renewable natural resources. Heirs of nationalism, Hugo Chavez (Venezuela), Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and Evo Morales (Bolivia) strengthened the role of the State in the exploitation of hydrocarbons. Thus, despite the constraints imposed by the sector’s institutions these presidents brought about a break with the prior relationship between the state and the market. Nevertheless, much remained unchanged despite presidential speeches, and even constitutions, promoting the protection of the environment and citizen participation. Governments of the left yielded to the appeal of significant revenues generated by resource extraction projects. Thus, the model of an economy based on resource extraction remained in force despite calls from the ecologists of the left and the mobilization of indigenous populations.

11. **Beyond Open Regionalism. The left faced with the trap of sovereignty and flexibility.**

Olivier Dabène
The left arrived in power carrying a message in favor of regional integration. Revival was the order of the day, as was a shift in emphasis in favor of a post-commercial agenda focused on promoting development. The results are mixed after a decade that saw the revival of MERCOSUR, and the failure of the more ambitious Bolivarian Alliance initiative (ALBA). This chapter sets forth two explanations for the modest progress in regionalism: one is based on the importance placed by the left on the defense of sovereignty which limited its ability to push for deeper regionalism; the other is based on the flexibility of the integration agreements to which the left adhered. Any hope for regional solidarity must be based on the Union of Latin American nations (UNASUR).

12. The Left and Social Integration in Central America. Kevin Parthenay
Social integration in Central America has resulted in important institutional and normative changes in the past twenty years and shows unprecedented dynamism today. This chapter analyses this change by comparing the national and supranational level and examining whether Central American governments are agents of change in the regional integration process. In fact, despite the pragmatism of leftist governments in the area of economic and commercial integration in Central America it is unclear whether they will be able to make a difference in the social area with which they are symbolically and traditionally associated. Empirically, the answer hinges on the simultaneous arrival in power of the left beginning in 2007. This chapter shows that the “Central American left” was not a force for regional integration because of its diversity and institutional constraints. Changes in social integration are more the result of exogenous (international cooperation) and endogenous (policy entrepreneurism, leadership).

13. The Latin American left and South-South relations. Elodie Brun
The focus of several of Latin America’s leftist governments, notably Lula of Brazil (2003-2010) and Hugo Chavez (since 1999), on the developing world raises questions about the relationship between the political affiliations of the leaders and the diplomatic reorientation of the country. The association of the election of a leftist government and a revival of south-south relations, while supported empirically, is in fact more nuanced. Latin American governments other than those on the left have also forged partnerships in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. In effect, many factors enter into the elaboration of foreign policy. These include economic motivations, and external demands. The change occasioned by leftist governments must therefore be put in perspective.