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TANZANIA: SHRINKING SPACE AND OPPOSITION PROTEST

Dan Paget

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The Tanzanian general election of October 2015 seemed to mark a moment of great democratic promise. In a state that has been an enduring bastion of single-party dominance in sub-Saharan Africa, opposition parties formed a pre-electoral coalition that held until election day. They were joined by a string of high-profile defectors from the ruling CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, or the Party of the Revolution) and selected the most prominent of these defectors, Edward Lowassa, as the opposition presidential candidate. He went on to win 40 percent of the vote, the strongest showing that an opposition candidate has ever achieved in Tanzania. This left CCM candidate John Pombe Magufuli with 58 percent of the vote—a seemingly strong performance, but the worst CCM has ever had.

In 2017, however, there are few signs that the 2015 contest was part of a process of “democratization by elections,” at least in any straightforward way. While 2015 was indeed a turning point, Tanzania since then has grown not more democratic, but less so. Even as Magufuli has assumed the role of anticorruption champion, CCM has shifted from its prior reliance on “soft” methods of domination to more starkly repressive measures—with newspaper suspensions, troubling new legislation, and a prohibition on political rallies. The opposition, meanwhile, has adopted the politics of protest. A new era of Tanzanian politics has brought repression and civil disobedience front and center in the relationship between government and opposition. To explain the origins and implications of these developments, we must look to recent shifts in the country’s party dynamics.

The emergence of a strong opposition in Tanzania is a political milestone and a symbolic blow to the ruling party. CCM was formed by
the amalgamation of political parties from Tanzania’s two constituent regions: Tanganyika on mainland Africa and Zanzibar, an archipelago of islands in the Indian Ocean 23 miles from the coast at its closest point. These two sovereign nations joined to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964. In 1977, the dominant parties on the mainland and in Zanzibar—TANU (the Tanganyika African National Union) and ASP (the Afro-Shirazi Party), respectively—merged to form CCM. Counting from either the time of the TANU’s 1961 rise to power or the ASP’s violent revolution three years later, CCM is the longest-ruling party in sub-Saharan Africa. The parties that formed CCM assumed power before other self-identified African liberation movements that still rule today (such as Frelimo in neighboring Mozambique and South Africa’s ANC). Equally, CCM has outlasted its sister socialist parties in Zambia and Uganda.

Despite political reforms in 1992 that allowed multiparty competition, CCM’s dominant position in Tanzanian politics appeared secure into the early years of the twenty-first century. In 2005, the party’s presidential candidate garnered 80 percent of the vote, and as recently as 2009, Barak Hoffman and Lindsay Robinson decried the country’s “missing opposition” in these pages. While it has achieved much, CCM has also become an emblematic case of ruling-party hegemony. In this context, the consolidation of Tanzania’s opposition presented the transformative possibility of a more democratic polity.

The trajectory taken by the victorious CCM since the 2015 vote, however, points in a different direction. The first strand of this new trajectory to emerge was a concerted attempt, led by the newly elected president Magufuli, to rein in government rent-seeking and to relaunch state-led industrialization. Although Magufuli’s executive orders and on-the-spot dismissals of officials smack of public performance, CCM appears to have genuinely embarked upon a new program. The second and more disturbing strand is a sharp authoritarian turn. While infringements on democratic norms have not been uncommon either in Tanzania or in the region more broadly, CCM has overseen a raft of laws and regulations that go unusually far in shrinking political space and constricting the opposition. Increasingly, the new CCM administration presents not only the promise of development, but also the threat of dictatorship.

Tanzania’s new political course has important implications for the wider neighborhood of East Africa, which is in a moment of democratic recession. The bordering countries of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are all governed by electoral authoritarian regimes of one variety or another. Though these regimes differ from one another in many ways, each benefits from the presence of neighbors that champion authoritarian development. Tanzania’s new administration has become a flashpoint in an international debate about democracy and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
From 1965 until 1992, Tanzania was a one-party regime in which TANU and then CCM faced few serious rivals. Accidents of history left Tanzania divided among small ethnic groups, mainly concentrated on the periphery and each ill-suited to serve as the basis for political opposition. While estimates vary, the most optimistic figures put the largest ethnic group short of even a fifth of the population. CCM and its predecessors built on these foundations by directing a highly successful state- and nation-building program that elevated Tanzanian identity above others and justified the exertion of state authority. To accomplish this, they made strategic use of a national language (Kiswahili), national history, socialist ideology, employment policy, and the threat that Tanzania’s involvement in liberation wars abroad posed to national security, among other things. Tanzania’s first president Julius Nyerere, who governed from 1964 until 1985, assumed a position of saint-like virtue in the popular imagination, an image that played a key role in legitimizing nation and party alike.3

In addition, TANU and later CCM took a range of measures to suppress possible challenges to their power. Potential opponents such as traditional chiefs, trade unions, and cooperatives were stripped of their powers and replaced by state bodies. Nationalization of industry and a leadership code that proscribed commercial activities by party and government officials obstructed private accumulation of wealth. Nyerere’s government banned rival political parties and institutionally tied the armed forces to CCM. The National Executive Committee of the party enjoyed de jure supremacy over the National Assembly, Tanzania’s unicameral legislature. Authorities preventively detained opponents of the regime, and media houses came under public ownership. Using such methods, CCM stifled dissent and quelled its opponents.

After Tanzania formally adopted a multiparty system in 1992, CCM continued to use and abuse state power to preserve its hegemony. As Göran Hydén described in these pages, the CCM leadership spearheaded Tanzania’s transition amid lackluster public zeal.4 The longtime ruling party’s position of strength enabled it to preserve many authoritarian laws already enacted, and CCM remained entrenched in the Tanzanian state. Since the transition from de jure one-party rule, observers have documented a wide variety of authoritarian infractions, including newspaper bans, media bias, political manipulation of constituency boundaries (gerrymandering), interruption of opposition campaigns, meddling in civic associations’ politics, and harassment by state officials, in particular by security forces.5
In spite of all these democratic deficits, the consensus view characterized CCM’s dominance as “soft,” rather than “hard” or openly authoritarian, until at least 2010. The party repressed, but was careful to do so discreetly and sparingly. Yonatan Morse concludes, “CCM is not an overtly authoritarian party but utilizes a highly effective party structure that has country-wide reach.” Tanzania’s leaders did not resort to more blatant authoritarian methods because they did not need to. As Richard Whitehead explains, a seemingly unassailable electoral position, unthreatened by ill-organized and unpopular opposition parties, allowed CCM to rely on “overt repression” less than almost every dominant party in the region.

The 2015 general election marked a break from, and perhaps an end to, the era in which party machinery and state largesse predominated over repression as means of preserving CCM’s rule. While Magufuli—a former minister of works who bears the moniker “The Bulldozer”—has become the face of Tanzania’s recent shift toward authoritarianism, he should not be mistaken for its cause. Rather, changes that have been gathering pace in Tanzania for a decade helped to set this shift in motion.

The New Authoritarianism

Since the beginning of 2015, a sharp authoritarian turn by CCM has constricted the freedoms of speech, of the press, and of assembly, as well as the space available for opposition parties to operate. Tanzania’s government has become intolerant of public dissent, frequently responding to criticism with arrests, license revocations, and state harassment. An early sign was the Cybercrimes Act, introduced in parliament in February 2015 and enacted in May, which has narrowed online space for partisan mobilization. It makes the online publication of information with intent to insult, abuse, threaten, or defame a criminal offense if the publisher knows the information to be false, deceptive, misleading, or inaccurate. A spate of individuals have been convicted under these broad provisions just for insulting Magufuli, in most cases for statements written in Whatsapp groups. Under the auspices of Article 31 of the same act, police raided two centers at which civic organizations and opposition parties were conducting parallel vote tabulations. Another piece of recent legislation, the Statistics Act, has curtailed the independence of researchers by dictating which organizations may generate and publish national statistics.

Media freedom has suffered due to several administrative measures. There has been a new wave of arbitrary suspensions of newspapers, including the widely-read Mwananchi and Mtanzania in 2013, the prestigious regional paper East African in 2015, and the tabloid Mawio in 2016. The government has also ended live television coverage of parliament, which now releases only selective and vetted material.
On top of these actions, the November 2016 Media Services Act created two new state-sponsored bodies empowered to grant and revoke licenses for news outlets and the accreditation of journalists, respectively. Though both bodies are nominally independent, rules for appointing members grant the state substantial control over each agency. Provisions of the Media Services Act have also allowed authorities to promulgate restrictions on foreign ownership of newspapers. Among the media outlets that this will affect are Mwananchi and the English-language Citizen, both owned by the Kenya-based Nations Media Group. In addition, the Act reintroduces broadly defined offenses of defamation and sedition, which have already been used to tie up opposition leaders, journalists, and media houses in numerous court actions.

Tanzania’s new leadership has singled out individual critics and repeatedly hinted that it is willing to curtail debate through censorship. In March of this year, Tanzanian rapper Emmanuel Elibariki was arrested for releasing a satirical song that contained a veiled criticism of the president. The song was also briefly banned from radio and television. In that same month, Magufuli declared, “Media owners, let me tell you: ‘Be careful. Watch it. If you think you have that kind of freedom—not to that extent.’” In late 2016, Magufuli declared that two unnamed newspapers’ “days were numbered.” Against this backdrop of increasingly severe government threats and repressive measures, self-censorship has been on the rise.

The ruling party has also made renewed efforts to quell the opposition. The Registrar for Political Parties, a government appointee, seems to have exacerbated a conflict within the second largest opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF). In 2015 then–CUF chairman Ibrahim Lipumba resigned, leaving party secretary-general Seif Sharif Hamad and his allies in control. Last year, the registrar formally recognized Lipumba’s subsequent decision to revoke his resignation, and the registrar has since channeled state funding intended for CUF to the Lipumba faction. This serves to distract CUF with a damaging conflict. Even worse, it might mean that two or more different bodies could claim the right to nominate CUF candidates in future elections, creating a series of legal quandaries for the party.

The most repressive new measures concern public assembly. On 7 June 2016, police imposed an indefinite ban on public meetings. This ban is a particularly severe infringement on political freedom in Tanzania because the country’s election campaign rallies are the best-attended in Africa. Data from Round 5 of the Afrobarometer (a cross-national African opinion survey) shows that 72 percent of all respondents in Tanzania reported attending a rally in the run-up to the 2010 election. The continent-wide average rate was just 37 percent. In a country where a mere 18 and 53 percent of respondents report getting daily news from television and radio, respectively, this rate of attendance makes the rally a vital channel of political communication. The ban will likely be lifted for the two-month campaigns leading up to conjoint presidential, par-
liamentary, and councilor elections in 2020, but has nonetheless dealt a serious blow to freedom of expression.

At the end of July in 2015, this ban was relaxed to permit rallies held by sitting MPs in their constituencies, but rallies that do not meet these restrictive criteria remain forbidden. Since CCM holds 252 of the 367 seats in the National Assembly, this narrow exemption further tilts the playing field against the opposition. What’s more, police have applied the ban inconsistently, often permitting CCM officials to convene rallies. In fact, Magufuli defended the ban on public meetings while himself addressing a rally.

The ban represents a serious challenge for Chadema (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo, or Party for Democracy and Development), the largest opposition party. Between 2007 and 2015, Chadema’s leaders convened public meetings outside the election season to strengthen the party’s support and structures. As part of a broader program of establishing local organs, Chadema used these rallies to recruit new members and organize them into local branches. Tundu Lissu, a leading member of the party’s Central Committee, explained that “the only way you win is if you start early.”12 Rallies outside the campaign period were one of the few strategies available to Chadema as it sought to build a party that could rival CCM.

The Origins of CCM’s New Strategy

The temptation in popular analyses of Tanzania has been to attribute CCM’s new repressive measures to Magufuli himself.13 It is true that Magufuli cuts an authoritarian figure. He makes heavy use of executive orders, countenances no criticism, interferes with judicial independence, and overrides horizontal checks and balances.

Yet while Magufuli is a visible symbol of the closure of political space in Tanzania, he is not its primary cause. To begin with, the sequence of cause and effect is wrong. Legislators had introduced the Media Services Bill, the Cybercrimes Bill, and the Statistics Bill in the National Assembly more than five months before CCM chose Magufuli as its presidential candidate in July 2015. Magufuli could not plausibly have been directing these changes behind the scenes, because his nomination was a surprise outcome: He held little power in CCM himself and won the nomination through a compromise among party factions, most likely thanks to a deal orchestrated by former presidents Jakaya Kikwete (2005–15) and Benjamin Mkapa (1995–2005). Instead, Magufuli has embraced an authoritarian agenda that he inherited, one that belongs to CCM as a party.

This agenda is in significant part a response to recent changes in Tanzania’s party system. As the Figure shows, CCM’s margin of victory fell from an unassailable 68 percent in 2005 to 18 percent in 2015, making the party newly vulnerable. Over the same period, the opposition has
grown and cohered. Most accounts of the opposition’s rise privilege developments at the elite level, including the opposition electoral coalition described above as well as defections from CCM.

Yet the most important changes in Chadema took place below the surface. Chadema engaged in a major party-building exercise between 2004 and 2015. By its own estimates, Chadema oversaw elections to committees for 51,947 foundations or neighborhood units and 16,359 branches by 2014.14 Through these low-level organs, the party is gaining a local presence and mobilizational strength. In parallel, Chadema attracted a wide selection of funders from the Tanzanian business sector. While the popularity of Chadema’s leaders and of its stances on particular issues may come and go, these new organizational and financial assets will lend the party a durable electoral strength.

For the first time since independence, CCM faces a credible electoral threat. It has become possible, even if not likely, that the opposition might grow strong enough to win in a hypothetical free and fair election in the near future. In turn, CCM has demonstrated that it is willing to drastically narrow political space to reduce the likelihood of an opposition victory. As Ruth Carlitz and Keith Weghorst conclude, “their [CCM’s] actions are consistent with the behavior of a ruling party willing to hold onto power at any costs.”15 In this regard, CCM follows in a long tradition of dominant parties in hybrid regimes that turn to more authoritarian forms of rule as the threat from the opposition grows. Action is always shaped by a mixture of structure and agency, but the
root cause of CCM’s new authoritarianism lies in the shifting balance between the governing party and the opposition, not the leadership of Magufuli himself.

Magufuli’s anticorruption agenda at once relieves and compounds CCM’s electoral vulnerability. It helps CCM by countering its reputation for embezzlement and self-enrichment—an image crystallized by a series of grand corruption scandals and readily promoted by opposition parties with their growing local structures. While CCM’s ability to extract state funds has proved an asset during elections, many believe that the scale and public exposure of the party’s rent-seeking also made it a liability. Magufuli is attempting to discipline, manage, and exert control from the center over rent-seeking in CCM. His public confrontations with allegedly corrupt forces in the party and state have somewhat redeemed CCM in the eyes of the public.

Yet Magufuli’s program also endangers CCM’s dominance, since it may provoke resistance from actors within the party who are threatened by it. Recurring intraparty conflict and defections to opposition parties would damage CCM’s electoral prospects. Recent measures constricting political space, however, have lowered the benefits and raised the risks of defection by sending a clear signal that CCM intends to win at any cost. In all likelihood, Magufuli is doubling down on repressive tactics to secure the political maneuvering room he needs to push through his agenda.

At the same time, Magufuli is seeking to restore elite cohesion within CCM by playing to romantic visions of its long-eschewed socialist past. To that end, he has tried to implicitly associate himself with the revered first president, Julius Nyerere. Magufuli has overtly embraced the strategy of state-led industrialization, as embodied in the country’s most recent five-year plan, and has selectively sought fights with foreign companies and corrupt business interests, real or imagined. He has revived projects from earlier periods—for example, restarting the movement of government offices from the coastal city of Dar es Salaam, the country’s previous capital and leading commercial center, to inland Dodoma, the administrative capital since 1974. Implicitly likening Julius Nyerere’s agenda to his own offers Magufuli a way to win the support of a party in which he had little power before assuming the presidency, as well as to keep a lid on party elites upset by his anticorruption policies.

Chadema Plots a New Course

As CCM has become more authoritarian, the opposition has increasingly resorted to protest. In the past, Chadema campaigned first and foremost on the argument that CCM was systematically corrupt and that this corruption stymied development in Tanzania—a country whose 2015 GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity dollars) was under $2,700 and where poverty is widespread. Chadema, its members promised, would
pursue similar developmental goals, but would do so with the integrity that CCM lacked. Ideological differences between the socialist CCM and the promarket Chadema took a back seat to debates about corruption.

Since the election of 2015, however, Chadema has shifted its emphasis to focus more on issues of democracy and dictatorship, and less on corruption. A resolution passed by Chadema’s Central Committee in July 2016 stated that “democracy is in detention while dictatorship has taken its place in our country” and encouraged “civic disobedience of the illegitimate [CCM-led] Zanzibar Government.” Chadema’s leaders use this kind of evocative language on a daily basis.

Chadema has also made state repression the subject of protest. When Magufuli gave his inaugural address to the National Assembly in November 2015, opposition MPs interrupted the session and were forcibly removed from the chamber by police. On January 27, opposition MPs again interrupted an Assembly session in protest against the end of live television coverage of the legislature. As police approached the MPs to carry them out, one opposition MP was heard declaring, “I won’t leave this chamber. You can kill me . . . I’m ready.” While the opposition often has reasonable grounds for protest, it treats these moments as important pieces of political theater. As Chadema’s secretary-general Vincent Mashinji stated, “The standing orders do not allow for police to enter the chamber [of the Assembly]. So if you bring them in, it becomes a message. It becomes news.”

The opposition has not simply reacted to CCM pressure: It has also taken the initiative in manufacturing and stylizing protest. On 16 June 2016, Chadema MPs appeared before cameras outside the National Assembly with their mouths sealed by gags. Chadema has sought out confrontations with state agents in order to place them publicly in the role of oppressors. Mashinji candidly offered a hypothetical example. “If I go home now, I reach the airport. They [the police] want to arrest me. [Senior party official John] Mrema will tell me ‘just go [to the police and let them arrest you]’ because tomorrow morning, it will be news.”

Chadema had this objective in mind when it announced Operation UKUTA (“Umoja wa Kupinga Udikteta Tanzania” in Kiswahili, or “Alliance Against Dictatorship in Tanzania”). The party planned to convene rallies across Tanzania on 1 September 2016 in defiance of the government’s ban. Defying the state on this particular issue was a deft choice. Chadema argued that the ban conflicts with both particular laws and the constitution, and thus participants would be disobeying the police, who promulgated the restriction, but not the law. Mrema explained that “UKUTA was made to mobilize people across the country.” While Chadema’s plan was to begin with a “Day of Defiance,” one of the chief architects of the program, Mwesiga Baregu, explained that this event was “intended to kick-off a series of varied activities of peaceful resistance against creeping dictatorship
in the country.” Through civil disobedience at the elite and mass levels, Chadema has sought to shift the focus of political debate in Tanzania.

In part, Chadema’s new emphasis on protests against authoritarianism is a response to shifting ownership of the corruption issue. Chadema damaged its own integrity in 2015 by welcoming Edward Lowassa, a symbol of elite money politics in Tanzania, when he defected from CCM. Lowassa was implicated in the Richmond saga, a major corruption scandal in 2008, and he figured on the opposition’s “List of Shame” in 2010. Many interpreted his appointment as Chadema’s presidential candidate as a sign that the opposition party cared more about power than about principle.

At the same time, CCM has made leaps and bounds in reclaiming the mantle of political morality in Tanzania. Magufuli’s anticorruption drive has been overwhelmingly popular. Government campaigns against late closing times for bars, sheesha smoking, homosexuality, and most recently the drug trade have helped to burnish CCM’s moral image. So have the party’s recent invocations of Tanzania’s founder. CCM has sought to present Magufuli’s personal thrift, his intolerance for corruption, and his social conservativism as embodying a political morality that evokes Nyerere’s own.

By focusing on CCM’s authoritarianism and the injustices facing the opposition, Chadema has tried to shift attention away from subjects on which it was fast losing traction to a topic on which it enjoys a popular advantage. Chadema’s aims, however, go beyond enhancing its own popularity. All the signs suggest that Chadema seeks to delegitimize institutional changes that constrict political space. Protest actions at the elite and mass levels are a way to contest the alterations that CCM has made to the rules of the game.

At the eleventh hour before UKUTA was to commence on 1 September 2016, Chadema postponed the action. The next month, it canceled UKUTA indefinitely. Some speculated that Chadema called off the protests because it feared low turnout. Yet a survey of more than 1,600 people conducted just days before September 1 found that 9.2 percent of respondents described themselves as “likely” to participate. While declaring intent to protest is not the same as actually protesting, a figure this high suggests that the turnout would have been unprecedented.

Instead, two strategic concerns probably led to the decision by Chadema’s leaders. The first was the possibility that the planned action would reinforce the idea that opposition means instability and violence, as CCM had been suggesting for decades. In a country whose citizens are proud of their legacy of peace since independence, being viewed as a source of violence is a sure path to unpopularity. The second concern was the fear that the government would respond to protest with forceful repression and exploit this opportunity to dismantle the opposition apparatus. Chadema leaders themselves emphasized this second reason. Days before September 1, the police and the army conducted exercises in the streets in a show
of strength. Mass arrests might have tied up many of Chadema’s local leaders. In Mwesiga Baregu’s words, “In light of the overreaction of the government including [an] open show of force we prudently decided to avoid confrontation in which loss of lives was almost certain. This could have also been used as a pretext to ban opposition parties altogether.”

CCM met brinkmanship with brinkmanship, and won.

In confronting opposition-directed protest, CCM enjoys the advantage of being closely tied to Tanzania’s security structures. Long institutionally intertwined with the military, the party also is careful to foster close relations with other security organs. After his election, Magufuli went to great efforts to promote former military personnel to civilian positions and to increase police funding. These cross-institutional ties reduce the possibility that Tanzania will experience the kind of splits between hard-liners and soft-liners that so often precede political liberalization. They also leave CCM free to deploy the security forces against the opposition with little fear of triggering defections.

Chadema, on the other hand, suffers from a dearth of experience in civil resistance. Previously focused on peaceful campaigning, its members have seldom participated in disciplined demonstrations under threat from security forces. Nor has party training imparted the skills or discipline necessary for successful actions of civil disobedience. Yet Chadema’s step back from mass protests in 2016 is not likely to be the end of opposition resistance in Tanzania. First, since November 2016 the opposition has, in the words of senior party official John Mrema, “adopted a new strategy of going down to the grassroots.” Chadema has dispatched its senior leaders and their delegates to meet with the leaders of every party organ down to the branch level. This local approach is a sign of party adaptation: Given the ban on rallies, campaigning house-to-house and at indoor meetings is Chadema’s best remaining avenue through which to reach voters. In this way, CCM repression may have the unintended consequence of helping Chadema to strengthen its organization.

Renewed grassroots work is also a tentative sign of Chadema’s resolve to transform itself into an organization with the discipline and skills needed for civil disobedience. Mrema described this work as enabling a possible “next step.” Baregu was more direct: “We have so far covered almost 90 percent of all the constituencies in the country, reinforcing leadership where it exists and installing it where it doesn’t or is weak. We continue to strengthen the human wall of resistance.”

The Zanzibar Effect

The pattern of a ruling party that responds to competition with repression, leading opposition parties to resist through protest, is to some extent familiar from other cases. Scholars have described these actions as attempts to set and control the rules of the game surrounding electoral
In Tanzania these dynamics are complicated by the country’s unusual federal structure: For 25 years, the subnational politics of Zanzibar have provided a testing ground for dominant and opposition parties alike. Experience gained through local political contests there has influenced how CCM and its rivals interact on the national stage.

Mainland Tanzania boasts a population of 43 million. Zanzibar, primarily formed from the two large islands of Unguja and Pemba, has a population of just over two million. Nonetheless, after the Acts of Union in 1964, Zanzibar retained substantial political autonomy in an asymmetric federal arrangement. In addition to electing representatives to national office, it elects a president of Zanzibar and its own House of Representatives.

Zanzibari nationalism still runs through the contemporary politics of the islands. Partisans have made use of competing, sometimes questionable historical narratives concerning unification; the 1972 assassination of Zanzibar’s first president, Abeid Karume; and misrule by the mainland to foster political divisions. By the onset of multiparty elections in 1995, approximately half the population supported CCM and half CUF, a party that demands greater autonomy and, at times, independence for Zanzibar. CUF wins votes on the mainland and in the isles alike, but in Zanzibar CUF is the strongest opposition party. While both parties’ support is demographically diverse, CUF attracts its voters based on overlapping and constructed categories of nationality, race, religion, and region. CUF voters are more likely than others to be Muslim, to identify as Omani or Shirazi (Persian), and to hail from Pemba, the northernmost of the two large islands in the archipelago. However, most of all the party appeals to Zanzibari identities. These cleavages grant CUF electoral strength.

The dynamics of repression and protest now gripping Tanzania at the national level could be seen in Zanzibar well before 2015. Extensive evidence suggests that selective fraud has plagued every election for the presidency and House of Representatives of Zanzibar since 1995. Observers have contended that the results of the 1995 presidential election were fixed to let CCM win by 1,565 votes, and severe irregularities again arose in the 2000 presidential vote. By the admission of its own secretary-general, CUF was taken by surprise by the alleged fraud in 1995. In the year 2000, however, it coordinated protests in response to electoral interference, resulting in violence on the streets, and it initiated a boycott of the House of Representatives. Allegations of rigging and demonstrations marked the 2005 election as well.

Three processes of attempted reconciliation named Muafaka I, Muafaka II, and Maridhiano punctuated this cycle of alleged electoral fraud and protest. Despite several breakdowns in negotiations, these processes led to major reforms: roles for opposition representatives in running the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), changes to electoral rules, and by 2010, power-sharing arrangements. This lowered the political temperature, but it involved resource transfers and alterations in electoral rules that favored CUF.
In the 2015 elections, the reforms made to the ZEC as part of Maridhiano gave CCM little room to interfere covertly with the electoral process. CUF also parallel-tabulated votes at each polling station, presenting a further obstacle to fraud. Midway through counting, both the opposition tabulations and the results released by the ZEC showed that CCM was headed for a loss. Faced by the prospect of electoral defeat, the ZEC chairman annulled the election.\textsuperscript{30} The election was rerun in March, but campaigning was banned. In protest, CUF boycotted the rerun and has refused to recognize its outcome.

Despite the isles’ small share of Tanzania’s population, the contestation over electoral rules in Zanzibar has helped to determine the terrain of national-level political struggle. The evidence suggests that CCM has learned from its experiences in Zanzibar that electoral fraud is costly if publicly exposed. It can provoke protest or, worse still, force CCM into reforms that reduce its room for interference in subsequent elections. CCM may well wish to prevent a national-level reprise of the process that played out in Zanzibar.

CCM’s recent authoritarian legislation should be interpreted in this context. The Cybercrimes Act, the Media Services Act, and the ban on rallies all impede the efforts of opposition parties to spread their messages to voters. By decreasing the likelihood that CCM will lose elections in the future, they seek to preempt the process of fraud, protest, and reform that has already played out in Zanzibar. CCM’s actions are consistent with those of a party hoping to avoid the need to fix elections. At the same time, the new legislation also enables CCM to stifle news about electoral fraud if it ever turns to rigging as a last resort. The lessons of Zanzibari politics have helped to produce a nationwide political struggle that, rather than centering exclusively on questions of election process and management, is also focused on the laws that govern freedom of expression.

\textbf{What Lies Ahead}

Until at least 2010, Tanzanian politics was characterized by ruling-party dominance, growing rent-seeking, opposition party-building, and slow political liberalization. The hallmarks of contemporary Tanzania, however, are widespread authoritarianism and opposition civil disobedience. It is unclear where Tanzania’s new path will lead. If Magufuli’s anticorruption campaign remains popular, he may judge that he can do without the ban on rallies for the time being. In that case, the impetus for oppression, protest, and brinkmanship may evaporate. But if CCM stays its current authoritarian course, the country’s political future will hinge on whether CUF and Chadema choose to engage in mass as well as elite civil disobedience. If they do, the result may be the same cycles of polarization and violence that have played out elsewhere on the continent.\textsuperscript{31}

The cancellation of Operation UKUTA may be a sign that Chadema
weighed the risks of protest and reconsidered. Nonetheless, opposition parties both on Zanzibar and on the mainland have already shown themselves capable of great feats of organization and adaptation. They may yet decide to undergo the training, discipline, and restructuring necessary for acts of civil disobedience. Ultimately, if CCM continues to constrict political space, the opposition may feel that it has no alternative but to resort to the politics of protest. As Chadema’s secretary-general remarked: “If the political environment was good, you could do rallies, civic education, you could demonstrate, but that space is not there anymore. So, which spaces are remaining? It’s blank.”

NOTES


11. Afrobarometer, Tanzania Round 5 (confidence intervals of 1 percent); Afrobarometer, all countries, Round 5.

12. Interview with Tundu Lissu, Dar es Salaam, 9 August 2015.

13. Jenerali Ulimwengu, “Do We Want a Dictatorship in Tanzania? Don’t Forget,


19. Interview with Vincent Mashinji, Copenhagen, 26 September 2016.

20. Interview with Mashinji.

21. Interview with John Mrema, Copenhagen, 26 September 2016.


23. Sauti za Wananchi, “Mobile Phone Survey Round 12 Second Panel,” Twaweza, September 2016. Field-work was conducted between August 20 and 29, 2016. Lower- and upper-bound 95 percent confidence intervals of 7.8 percent and 11 percent.


32. Interview with Mashinji.