Welcome to the sixth edition of Inspires, the alumni magazine of the Department of Politics and International Relations. We hope you enjoy it, and as ever, please send us your comments and suggestions for future editions.

We very much enjoyed meeting so many of you last November, when the department hosted a day of fascinating discussion on the topic of ‘International Security: Scholarship and Practice’. It was a wonderful opportunity to exchange insights relating to our academic research and the varied work that our alumni are involved with across the world. We hear that conversation at the Alumni Weekend in North America in April was just as good. Looking ahead, there is the university-wide Oxford Alumni Weekend in September, and the networking event that the department will be hosting in London in November. Please also save the date for our 4 March 2017 alumni event, focussing on the BRICS countries. Please see the back cover of this magazine for full details. We hope that you are able to join us.

In this issue of Inspires we again offer a diverse range of articles, matching the broad coverage of the research undertaken within the department. In addition, we are very pleased to share some of the research which is being carried out by our DPhil students. Doctoral students are vital to the life of the department - enabling the very best and brightest students to study here is an important goal for the department, and indeed one we hope that you will feel able to help us to achieve. We also feature a ‘Life After’ piece on the Diploma in Economics and Political Science, a degree which introduced many of our alumni to the study of politics.

We are always keen to keep in contact with our alumni, and we are now planning to launch a regular email newsletter specifically about our research, to complement the existing Alumni Newswire. If you would like to check that we have your current email address, or you would like to change your email preferences (so that you can opt in or out of our departmental publications), you can do this through our website, www.alumniweb.ox.ac.uk/dpir. We are also always pleased to receive submissions to our ‘Classnotes’ and ‘Life after...’ pages online, which can be found at www.politics.ox.ac.uk/alumni. We enjoy reading your news there, and hope that you find it a useful way to hear what your former classmates are doing.

We look forward to hearing from you,

Kate Candy, Charlie Game and Stuart White
It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to another fantastic edition of Inspires. As usual, we offer a very wide selection of articles, reflecting the great variety of research which takes place here. In this issue, Nick Owen looks at the role outsiders have played in social movements, Angela Cummine discusses citizens’ control over state assets, and Rasmus Nielsen charts the future of digital news. We also have Dominic Johnson on what evolutionary biology can tell us about international relations, and Neil Macfarlane looking back on a career-long engagement with the Caucasus region, which first sparked his interest before the end of the cold war. Finally, in conversation with Félix Krawatzek, Nancy Bermeo draws lessons from her experience of the promotion of democracy, from revolutionary Portugal to the Arab Spring.

Of course, the research which takes place here is not limited to our academics, and the impressive range and depth of study undertaken by our doctoral students is something of which we are extremely proud. Our excellent graduate students are vital to the life of the department, and walking across the department, one always has to be careful not to be waylaid by the enticing books piled on students’ desks. We are very grateful that two of our doctoral students, Susan Divall and Nicholas Barker, have agreed to share with Inspires the work that they are currently undertaking, and also some of the work that they would like to go on to do. Both Susan and Nicholas are recipients of scholarships, and we are extremely grateful that they are able to study here. Funding doctoral students gives the brightest minds the chance to address some of the world’s most difficult political issues. We are proud that our students go on to have far-reaching effects on the world – as practitioners or as academics working to understand and to solve some of the most intractable political problems.

We are proud that our students go on to have far-reaching effects on the world – as practitioners or as academics working to understand and to solve some of the most intractable political problems.

I very much enjoyed meeting so many of you at the department’s alumni event on ‘International Security: Scholarship and Practice’ in November 2015 and also at the University’s Washington DC Alumni Weekend April 2016. I hope that you enjoyed the discussion and debate as much as I did. There will certainly be many more occasions for politics alumni to meet, and we have outlined some upcoming events on the rear cover of this magazine. Looking further ahead, we are approaching the anniversary of the degree which has for (nearly) a century, provided the cornerstone of politics teaching at Oxford, the Modern Greats, PPE. When you look at the seismic changes that have taken place in higher education since 1920, a century is a phenomenally long time for a degree program to have existed. PPE’s longevity is testament to the explanatory power of the three subjects, the rigour and prestige of an Oxford education, and also the flexibility and adaptability of the degree. We fully intend to mark the occasion appropriately, and those of you who joined us in Washington DC will have seen the PPE 2020 brochure. Please look out for more details as we approach the date.

Sadly, this will be my last issue of Inspires as Head of Department, as in January 2017 I will be succeeded by Professor Louise Fawcett, who is Wilfrid Knapp Fellow at St Catherine’s College. I would like to take this opportunity to say what a great honour it has been to engage with alumni during my time as Head of Department. Hearing about the experiences and careers that our students go ont after studying here is always inspirational, and the contribution that alumni make to the Oxford community is something that makes this place truly special. I will of course continue to be part of the department, and I look forward to many more such conversations, both as an academic, and as a PPE alumnus!
I

In research on social movements, it is often useful to distinguish between participants who stand to benefit if the movement achieves its goal, and participants who don’t. Theorists usually call the latter ‘conscience constituents’. They are thought to be important because they sometimes help to get movements started when the beneficiaries are unable to co-operate sufficiently to achieve their goal.

This lack of co-operation is quite common, because even sharing an interest with other beneficiaries is not always sufficient to motivate participation. A rational, self-interested beneficiary will ask herself not only what the goal is worth to her, but how far her own participation is a necessary condition of achieving it. It may be that she can take a free ride on others’ participation, and secure the goal without needing to do anything herself.

Conscience constituents, self-propelled by their own consciences, can, it is thought, be a useful stimulus for collective action. Acting as unpaid entrepreneurs, they can help latent movements get started or grow, by providing the initial confidence or organisational framework within which rational self-interest can promote co-operation.

I think this approach does not do enough to illuminate its subject matter. For one thing, there are many considerations that might motivate non-beneficiaries to act in others’ interests, and they cannot all be boiled down to conscience without distortion. For another, conscience itself is a complex motivation, and relying on it can be costly for social movements. Existing theory mistakenly treats it as a useful source of free energy, without considering where it comes from, or what costs it creates.

Conscience itself, after all, is both personally owned, and also located outside us. This is how it motivates people, but also why it can be awkward for social movements made up principally of beneficiaries. The part that belongs to others tends to be ‘glue’ and not solvent, holding us together. And the part of conscience that belongs to others is both ‘slack’ and not solvent, holding us apart.

One strong possibility is that conscience constituents are motivated by what I term a disjoint norm of mutual self-interest. For, as I argue, they are more than simply altruistic, and can be contrasted with conjoint norms of mutual self-interest which arise when people bind each other to help each other. But frictions can arise in social movements when some participants are motivated by conjoint norms of self-interest, and others – conscience constituents – are motivated by disjoint norms of service. However, this friction does not always occur. Conscience constituents seem to be most acceptable and useful in movements oriented to the pursuit of already-formed – or crystallised – interests. But they seem less acceptable and useful when interests are emerging. Furthermore, social movements work in other orientations too. They are not only concerned with contesting the neglect of their interests by the outside world. They also seek to express historically submerged identities and unappreciated needs, and to empower people who have been denied autonomy to act for themselves.

The privileges and connections that make the conscience constituent valuable to social movements can therefore sometimes be a curse. It is not exactly that conscience constituents are more or less useful in any particular type of movement, but that their value may vary by orientation, ambition, as well as across the life cycle of a social movement, and according to long run historical changes.

To test these ideas, I consider a set of British historical case studies over the last two hundred years. As well as seeking to answer the question of why conscience constituents are present or absent, and what problems they solve and create, I hope that these case studies also throw light on some intriguing historical questions.

Why, for example, has it sometimes (but not always) been possible for workers to be represented in Parliament by middle class Labour MPs? What sort of changes do middle class people need to make to the way they live when they participate in workers’ movements? This question was the subject of a vigorous but forgotten debate among British socialists in the 1880s. (Some thought everything ought to change, and others nothing.) Why were male sympathisers mobilised in the Edwardian women’s suffrage movement, but demobilised in the contemporary Global Justice Movement? And are there emerging sorts of social movement work, in which conscience constituents can participate without difficulty?

I am building a website to present the first results of this project. It will be accessible later this summer via the departmental website.

Nick Owen
Associate Professor of Politics,
Proctor in Politics, Queen’s College,
Department of Politics, Cambridge University.
Who Owns State Assets?

The case for citizen control over public wealth

Angela Cummine discusses why and how citizens should enjoy stronger property rights over collective public assets.

Greek national assets are up for sale. Everything from vital infrastructure like Athens Water Supply, the country’s main ports at Piraeus and Thessaloniki and 14 regional airports, to symbolic assets like the 2004 Olympic complex and Hellinick Post. As part of Greece’s third bailout deal struck in July 2015, privatisation proceeds from state assets must go into an independent fund to help repay Greece’s international creditors.

For many Greeks, this arrangement feels like selling off the family silver, only to hand back the proceeds to those demanding its sale. It was reportedly this sticking point that nearly scuttled the €86 billion three year debt relief program and forced Greece to rethink privatisation. It was first suggested as a fund-raising strategy to pay off debt in 2010, several German politicians controversially suggested Greece sell off its uninhabited islands and historic monuments to pay down debt. Greeks responded by boycotting German imports.

Despite the protests, the original Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF) was established in 2011 to oversee a privatisation program. Known as Taipedi, this initial fund was expected to generate €50 billion in sale proceeds within five years. But by early 2015, only €3.2 billion sat in the fund. Most key infrastructure assets were unsold. When the Syriza party took office on an anti-austerity mandate at the start of 2015, they sacked Taipedi’s leaders and halted the sale of numerous assets. A near-completed purchase of ADMIE, Greece’s electricity network operator was cancelled.

ADME is now for sale again and the privatisation program rolls on. But Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras secured two concessions on the management and use of privatisation assets in the third bailout deal: the privatisation fund must be run from Athens, not Luxembourg as the creditors had wished; and part of its capital must be invested in Greece. The final deal allocated half of the new fund’s anticipated €12.5 billion to pay off creditors. In short, Greeks wanted more control over and benefit from the fund holding the proceeds of their national assets.

It is no surprise that the two conditions insisted upon by Prime Minister Tsipras to render the privatisation fund acceptable to Greek citizens were greater control and benefit, for these are the two core components of property rights. Pleas for more local control and benefit are ultimately pleas of ownership. But how can control and benefit rights over property be given effect when it comes to shared public assets like those in the Greek privatisation fund?

This same question arises in relation to other financial assets owned by the state, chiefly sovereign wealth sitting in Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). SWFs are state-owned investment vehicles that hold and invest public wealth in financial markets for a return. Sovereign funds are typically seeded with windfalls from commodity exports, privatisation proceeds or foreign exchange assets to act as savings or stabilisation vehicles. More than 60 governments globally possess a SWF, the majority of which were established since the year 2000. Their rapid increase in number has been matched by an explosive growth in the total value of SWF assets, currently around $17 trillion.

As in Greece, disputes over how to control and benefit from sovereign wealth plague numerous communities. Conflict has occurred in Alaska, Mongolia and Chile over the best use of SWF returns; in Norway, Australia, and New Zealand over how to invest sovereign wealth ethically; and in Korea, China and Nigeria over the management of SWF assets. At the heart of all these wrangles is the thorny issue of who ultimately owns, and therefore deserves to control and benefit from this wealth: citizen or state?

In my forthcoming book Citizens’ Wealth: Why (and How) to Manage Sovereign Funds By the People For the People, published by Yale University Press, I argue that citizens are the ultimate owners of all government property. In making this case, I rely on a fiduciary understanding of the state, inherited from 17th century philosopher John Locke. Under Locke’s classic theory of the state, government is an agent for its principal, the people. This principal-agent conception of the citizen-state relationship implies a set of fiduciary principles that require the people to maintain control over their government agent. One such principle is that all property obtained by the agent while acting on the principal’s behalf ultimately belongs to the principal and must be managed exclusively and solely for their benefit.

On this view, citizens are the rightful owners of sovereign wealth.

Realising this theoretical ideal of citizen ownership over sovereign wealth has far-reaching practical implications for the design and operation of sovereign funds. In my book Citizens’ Wealth, I identify three areas of SWFs requiring reform to achieve citizen ownership: the management, investment and distribution of sovereign wealth. Possible reforms to SWF management and investment include improving citizens’ ability to directly influence and constrain SWF boards and management; greater transparency and direct accountability to citizens in fund operations, and ethical constraints on SWF investment to ensure the collective values of citizen owners are protected and promoted through sovereign wealth investment. The SWFs of Norway and New Zealand are exemplary in this regard, but most other funds require substantially more demonstration.

Citizens must also perceive and enjoy tangible benefit from their sovereign wealth, achievable through fairer distribution of SWF income. This can be done through collective or individual distribution of SWF returns to citizens. Individual distribution of a sovereign fund’s earnings to citizens occurs in Alaska where a proportion of the annual return on the Permanent Fund is distributed directly to residents on a per capita basis as an annual cash dividend. The dividend amount varies year-to-year, based on a complex formula. Recently, it has hovered between $1000 and $1500 per person.

Alternatively, sovereign funds can collectively distribute their earnings to their host community. There are different models for such distribution. The Norwegian approach requires a fixed portion of the fund’s value – capped at 4% of total fund capital – is transferred into the budget annually. Alternatively, the Singaporean government is constitutionally permitted to allocate up to 50% of the real and paper returns of its two sovereign funds, the Government Investment Corporation and Temasek, to the budget annually.

If such measures to promote citizen benefit and control over sovereign wealth are embraced, this would ensure that government managers of existing and future SWFs are truly agents of their principal, the people.

The UK has recently seen some suggestions along these lines. In 2014, London Mayor Boris Johnson advocated the creation of a “Citizen’s Wealth Fund” by combining the UK’s £30 billion public pension fund into one large government investment fund holding more than $100 billion that could invest in domestic private equity and infrastructure projects. But the capital in this fund will only truly be citizens’ wealth if ordinary Britons follow the footsteps of the Greeks and demand a degree of democratic control over and local benefit from their wealth fund.

References


Angela Cummine
British Academy Post-doctoral Fellow in Political Theory (New College)

“A ‘Citizen’s Wealth Fund’ should be managed by the people for the people”... Citizens’ Wealth: Why (and How) Sovereign Funds Should Be Managed by the People for the People will be published by Yale University Press on 16 August 2016.
The Diploma was offered to both members and non-members of the University between 1910 and 1967. The Diploma was a very popular choice for students at women’s colleges, especially prior to 1920, before which women were not admitted to full membership of the University. The majority of Diploma candidates studied at Ruskin College, with a few students at Campion House, Plater Hall and the Catholic Workers’ College. Many graduates went on to further studies in higher education in Oxford (particularly to PPE) and beyond. Following a review in 1966, the Diploma was replaced by a new Diploma in Social Studies for Mature Students.

The Diploma boasts many alumni who went on to become household names – those we know of include Lord Prescott and Baroness Lockwood.

The Diploma didn’t help me find a job as such, but it was before computers, and there were 14 of us doing the job. I’m told there are 90 now!

Being on that magazine was wonderful. Any significant article had to go through really good lawyers first – to see if there was anything that could be got at by the government, because we used to do exposés and things like that – people coming out of prison, and recounting what had gone on there.

I married a Law Professor, who was asked to write a constitution for Basutoland (modern Lesotho). He would work on it during the day, and I would go through his drafts at night.

Later, I came back to Oxford and worked on Politics and Social Sciences for the Oxford English Dictionary. That was before computers, and there were 14 of us doing the job. I’m told there are 90 now!

The diploma didn’t help me find a job as such, but it inspired an interest in politics which has remained with me ever since. I’ve certainly lived through some very interesting political history.
Two DPIR scholars share with Inspires an overview of their research and reflect on the value of scholarships in enabling them to continue with their studies.

I started as a DPhil student in International Relations in October 2015, and now, as I progress through my first year at Oxford, I’m refining my research proposal and drawing all the threads together into a coherent plan that will shape my doctoral research over the next few years.

My project focuses on the termination and aftermath of civil wars: I’m trying to identify and explain the ways in which the processes and dynamics of armed conflict can be sustained or changed over the course of a transition to peace, leading to different post-war outcomes. By building on the practical experience I gained working for a local peacebuilding NGO in Georgia, and challenging the way existing scholarship researches war to peace transitions, I hope to contribute to our understanding of how civil wars end and what shapes post-war politics after the fighting has stopped.

As a recipient of a joint Nuffield College/DPIR Scholarship, I can focus on my research and not have to worry about how I will support myself financially. It also makes it possible for me to get involved in other projects that complement my research, such as the Graduate Research Seminar that I co-convene at Nuffield, and the Working Group on Armed Conflict (part of Oxford’s Changing Character of War programme) that I co-ordinate. Like most people, I wasn’t in a position to self-fund my doctoral studies, so without the scholarship I wouldn’t be here. I’m very grateful to Nuffield and DPIR for the opportunity to complete my doctoral studies at Oxford.

After spending four years outside of academia navigating the policy world in Geneva and Budapest, last year I decided to take the plunge and pursue a doctorate, returning to my original fascination with minority rights, territorial politics and integration policy in Eastern Europe.

Whereas Western Europe’s main struggles since WWII relate to integration policy towards immigrants or “new” minorities, the challenge for Eastern Europe is with its “old” historic ethnic and national minorities, many of whom have simply ended up on the wrong side of the border after treaty revisions. My dissertation aims to explain the rich policy mosaic of minority rights across the region, particularly in the areas of political representation, dual citizenship policy and language policy. In particular, I want to compare the minority rights policies towards ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia and the effect that Hungary’s external kin-state policy has on the claims that Hungarian minorities make in their respective countries. I am especially interested in the role of historical legacies, nationalism and elite bargaining in explaining when and why these policies took hold. Given the history of nationalism’s violent past in Eastern Europe and communism’s attempt to sweep nationalism under the carpet, understanding the main factors in the creation of minority rights policies and their consequences will provide us with a better understanding of how to organise diverse societies and promote social cohesion.

I’m very grateful to the department for the studentship award which turned the possibility of coming back to Oxford into a reality. Returning to the dreaming spires and the stimulating academic life for doctoral studies has been a true pleasure.

DOCTORAL SCHOLARSHIPS
An opportunity to support our research

Two DPIR scholars share with Inspires an overview of their research and reflect on the value of scholarships in enabling them to continue with their studies.

Not all prospective doctoral students find that they can afford to study at Oxford; in fact only 60% of doctoral students at Oxford enjoy the security of full funding whilst pursuing their research.

We are delighted that recently enrolled doctoral students Nicholas Barker and Susan Divald have agreed to share an outline of their research along with their appreciation of the financial support they have received for their doctoral studies.

I’m very grateful to the department for the studentship which turned the possibility of coming back to Oxford into a reality. Returning to the dreaming spires and the stimulating academic life for doctoral studies has been a true pleasure.

We invite you to support students like Susan and Nicholas to ensure DPIR can attract and retain the very best doctoral researchers. So often students are unable to study with us as we cannot offer a graduate funding package of the sort provided by many other leading universities in the UK or abroad. Lack of funding is the overriding reason why students in receipt of an offer from Oxford will reluctantly have to decline the offer.

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Enquiries and further information: alumni@politics.ox.ac.uk

Thank you.
When we think of Europe, we tend to focus on our partners in the European Union and processes of deepening and widening Europe. But there is another Europe beyond the line: Russia and its neighbours.

In the winter of 1991, as a specialist in Soviet foreign and security policy, I found myself in the Soviet republic of Georgia for an academic meeting. The meeting involved Soviet and American colleagues who were trying to parse the international implications of rapid reform in the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev.

Georgia, meanwhile, had declared independence from the USSR. It was in the middle of its first, but not its last, civil war. Displaced persons from South Ossetia were holding a hunger strike on the steps of Georgia’s Parliament.

At a Georgian family dinner, the one thing our hosts wanted to show was a clandestine video of Georgia’s freshest national tragedy. In April 1989, Soviet troops suppressed a pro-independence demonstration. Many protesters were beaten to death with trenching shovels, and others died from the use of chemical agents. It was pretty clear the Georgians were not going back to the USSR.

Georgia was not alone in the aspiration to determination and sovereignty. It was clear that what I had worked on for the first part of my career was about to disappear. I shifted towards research on the consequences of the impending Soviet collapse.

Over the past 25 years, my research has focused on the emergence of new states out of the USSR. My particular interest has been the states of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. How do these new states create durable structures of governance that, ideally, provide public goods for their citizens? How do they formulate their foreign and national security policies in a very difficult neighbourhood? What international choices do they make? What is the nature of their interaction with the global economy?

These regions exist in a wider regional and international framework in which the major player is Russia. That has produced another line of research. How has Russia adjusted to its post-imperial status and its diminished stature in international society?

These preoccupations have led to more general lines of research: ethnic conflict and conflict resolution; the politics of humanitarian action; democratisation and state-building; peace-keeping and intervention in world politics; the role of international organisations in these processes; the relationship between regional and international systems; and the tangled connections between sovereignty and territorial integrity, national self-determination, and evolving understandings of human rights and their relation to the state. Ongoing research targets the re-emergence of Russia, its implications for the neighbourhood (forthcoming), and its changing relationship with NATO and the EU (forthcoming).

At a more theoretical level, this work raises a number of questions. In international society, is there a single set of normative principles that are generally accepted or is the normative framework of that society contested? Are states equal, or is there hierarchy of rights and responsibilities? Is that hierarchy accepted or contested? Do major states outside the Euro-Atlantic core accept the hegemonic understanding of international relations in global, post-territorial terms? Or are they wedded to earlier conceptions rooted in material power, territorial control, and zero-sum competition?

This research trajectory started with a large change in the international system – the Soviet collapse and the choices made by new states in a new regional framework. That project started at the micro-level. It continued to the regional level. I have become increasingly interested in situating that evolution in the context of major issues in international relations: regionalisation of international society, multipolarity, and the challenge to US and liberal hegemony by emerging, or re-emerging powers.

The recent crises in Ukraine, involving Russian aggression against a major neighbour, and in Syria, in which Russia intervened unilaterally in a devastating civil conflict, suggest that there is much left to explore.

In doing this work, I assume that the detailed understanding and interpretation of the history and culture of countries and regions make a useful contribution to the evolution of the discipline of international relations. In turn, the theoretical apparatus of international relations helps to structure how one makes sense out of specific local situations. There is an important space for dialogue between international relations theory and country and regional area studies.

Finally, I strongly believe that research should contribute to, and possibly have an impact upon, policy-making. In that context, I write for policy audiences on Eurasian issues, give presentations at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Royal College of Defence Studies, and participate in non-governmental specialist meetings in Europe and North America. I also provide advice to governments and legislators in the Caucasus.

For more information about my research, please see: www.politics.ox.ac.uk/academic-staff/neil-macfarlane.html

Neil MacFarlane
Lecturer in International Relations, Fellow, St Aneus College
Odyssey of an Engaged Scholar

Richard Joseph shares how his Oxford experiences were so transformative and have stayed with him throughout his subsequent academic career and work as a public commentator.

I arrived at New College on a Rhodes Scholarship in September 1966. It was a period, like now, of global turbulence. Although I enjoyed my studies and the life of Oxford, an essential part of me never left the US. As an undergraduate at Dartmouth College, 1961-65, I was active in the progressive movements of the day: on segregation, apartheid, imperialism, and poverty. Before coming to Oxford, I spent a year as a Fulbright Scholar in Grenoble, France. My disquiet about leaving the ‘Struggle’ in the US, however, was assuaged by returning the summer of 1966 to work on anti-poverty programs in the Office of Mayor John Lindsay in New York City.

From New York I traveled with fellow Rhodes Scholars to England on board the Queen Elizabeth. I began my studies at Oxford reading PPE but soon transferred to the BPhil in Politics. During my first three years, 1966-69, I indulged my intellectual passions, especially in political theory. Still memorable were lectures of the day: on segregation, apartheid, imperialism, and poverty. Thomas Hodgkin was one of the theoreticians of the day. My first three years at Oxford, following the year in France, enabled me to read widely in social history, philosophy, creative literature, and biography. For my BPhil degree, in addition to exams in political theory, comparative government, and general politics, I wrote special papers on African politics and the political thought of Hegel and Marx. Although selected as a Student at Nuffield in 1969, I elected to return to the US as a lecturer and doctoral student at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). America was still politically turbulent. My sympathies were with the radical wing of the American Civil Rights Movement, and with opponents of America’s alliances with Third World dictators and its involvement in Indochina wars.

The tension I had experienced throughout the sixties, between academics and political activism, was lessened when I began studying with the Balliol historian, Arabist, and Africanist, Thomas Lionel Hodgkin. The Hodgkins were a family dynasty of formidable and engaged scholars. My wife, Jennifer, and our young children spent many delightful weekends at their large family home in Ilmington, Warwickshire. Thomas’s wife, Dorothy Hodgkin, was an outstanding biochemist and Nobel Prize Laureate. A pioneer in the use of X-ray crystallography, she led the team that deciphered the structure of insulin. Thomas Hodgkin’s letters from Palestine, 1932-36, Nigerian Perspectives, (1960), and several seminal works on anti-colonial politics have profoundly influenced the study of the Arab and African worlds. He was also the founding director of the Institute of African Studies in Accra, Ghana.

My first three years at Oxford, following the year in France, enabled me to read widely in social history, philosophy, creative literature, and biography. For my BPhil degree, in addition to exams in political theory, comparative government, and general politics, I wrote special papers on African politics and the political thought of Hegel and Marx. Although selected as a Student at Nuffield in 1969, I elected to return to the US as a lecturer and doctoral student at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). America was still politically turbulent. My sympathies were with the radical wing of the American Civil Rights Movement, and with opponents of America’s alliances with Third World dictators and its involvement in Indochina wars.

I had written my BPhil thesis on a radical nationalist movement in French Cameroun, the Union des Populistes du Cameroun (UPC). After being banned and driven underground, the UPC had launched a guerrilla struggle, first against French colonial authorities, then against a national government installed with French support. My doctoral dissertation on the UPC, supervised by the now ‘retired’ Thomas Hodgkin, was completed in 1973 and later published by Oxford University Press. Subsequently translated into French, it remains a core reference work on anti-colonial movements and the shaping of what has come to be known as FrancAfrique. Full professorships at Dartmouth College, Emory University, and Northwestern University have been interspersed with policy positions at the Ford Foundation, the Carter Center, and as a non-resident Senior Fellow of The Brookings Institution.

My second book, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic, first published by Cambridge University Press in 1987, was recently re-issued. The theoretical framework developed as a lecturer at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 1976-79, has remained central to studies of Nigerian politics, and that of other countries throttled by corrupt and clientelistic systems. Whether as a university teacher, scholar-writer, or public commentator, my ability to draw on history, comparative government, political theory, and political economy, would not be possible without the foundational learning that took place at Oxford University.

Richard Joseph
PPE (New College, 1966) and BPhil in Politics (Nuffield College)
John Evans Professor of International History and Politics, Northwestern University
Religion gets a bad rap these days. Many of the greatest challenges we face in the new century have powerful religious overtones—whether Islamist terrorist groups, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, inter-faith conflicts in Nigeria or India, or big social questions such as abortion, birth control, or stem cell research. Beyond these obvious flash points, religion has been portrayed by prominent academics such as Samuel Huntington, Daniel Dennett, and Richard Dawkins as a destructive force in society and politics, as far back into human prehistory as we can see. This raises the hypothesis that religion has served an important adaptive function for human societies over the eons. If so, religion might have been favoured by evolution rather than rejected by it. Despite its costs—or perhaps precisely because of its costs—religion might have offered a way for societies to demonstrate coherence and commitment and thereby improve their ability to survive and thrive. In my new book God is Watching You, I lay out a theory for how this occurred, and it comes down to the problem of cooperation.

A major problem for human societies is how to achieve and sustain cooperation. While pairs of individuals can easily help each other to reap mutual benefits, cooperation among larger groups is much harder to achieve. The work of Mancur Olson and Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom has elucidated the challenges of this so-called ‘collective action problem’. By working together towards common goals, we can all be better off. However, individuals have strong incentives to ‘free ride’ on the efforts of others, since they will benefit from the products of collective action irrespective of whether or not you contribute (for example, you can drive on the roads even if you have never paid your taxes). Studies have long shown that even with only a few such free riders, cooperation breaks down unless special conditions are in place to deter them. One such special condition that works well to rescue cooperation is punishment. Punishment can elevate the cost of free riding above any benefits, making cooperation in everyone’s own interest—even for free riders themselves. Laboratory experiments have shown that allowing subjects in collective action games to punish free riders can crack the collective action problem and sustain high levels of cooperation. And of course in the real world, societies the world over have discovered this for themselves, and have developed legal, penal, and corrective institutions to punish free riders.

Interestingly, these punitive institutions are relatively new. So a big question remains: how did human supernatural beings arise and deter free riders in the past, before any such institutions existed? Many factors are likely to have been important here, but one ‘institution’ that did, in fact, exist is religion. Supernatural beings are diverse and complex, but they generally include the characteristic of monitoring and punishing selfish behaviour and violations of social norms. This has big implications. If people genuinely believe that they will suffer supernatural punishment for such behaviour, then they may be less inclined to risk it—even if there is zero policing by other human beings. It doesn’t matter if supernatural punishment is real or not. If people believe in it, then they may be deterred and alter their behaviour accordingly. Gods, so the argument goes, helped to solve one of humanity’s most enduring and thorny problems: the problem of collective action among self-interested agents.

This problem became particularly magnified around 10,000 years ago as human societies developed from small-scale foraging societies of extended kin groups, to large, settled, urbanised societies following the agricultural revolution. In these larger societies, the collective action problem became much worse because cooperation had to be established among very large groups of often anonymous strangers, so free riding became much easier than before. However, the evidence suggests that as societies got bigger, their gods got bigger too. While the wrath of local spirits and ancestors may have been needed greater powers and a broader juridical domain to remain a credible deterrent. This process has continued until we reached monolithic, omniscient and all-powerful gods that preside over societies of millions.

If God is watching, people may be more willing to suppress self-interest in the interests of wider society, and this may have been a crucial step in the transition of human societies from nomadic bands to settled civilisations. Today, the law may be watching us too, but interestingly supernatural agents have powers of surveillance and punishment that no secular institution could ever match. So even where secular forms of policing are present and consistent, religion may still have an edge.

But this positive role of religion in promoting cooperation has a dark side. Within states, both governments and gods enjoy an authority to control, protect and help citizens. But between states in the international system, there is no Leviathan to control, protect or help states, and the same asymmetry confronts religion. While religion can be effective at promoting cooperation within societies (or perhaps civilisations) that share belief in the same gods, these same gods find themselves impotent in their power over other societies. Or worse, they are disdained. As vital as religion may have been for promoting cooperation in the development of human societies and the rise of civilisations, at the international level where states often have different religions, God cannot undo the anarchy that exists between them. If anything, the force of religion within societies to promote moral certitude and within-group cohesion only solidifies differences among them. It is therefore vital for the future that we study why and when religion binds as well as how it divides.

For further information, please see: www.dominicjohnson.com

Dominic D.P. Johnson
Alastair Buchan Chair of International Relations
The United Nations: Substantive Powers Great and Small and the Organisational Features of Its Articles and Essays

The highlights of the life of the United Nations marked its seventieth anniversary, the United Nations: Substantive Powers Great and Small and the Organisational Features of Its Articles and Essays is the eight-volume milestone of their publications over the past year.


For over thirty years, the UK central government has faced a constant call for reform and modernisation, as successive governments have promised better and cheaper public services. The actual performance of this reformed bureaucracy is assessed in this book, which draws on both quantitative and qualitative analyses of government activity, using civil service wage bills, tax collection data, judicial reviews and elite interviews. The steadfast first lure of a leaner, more efficient system of public administration has seen the emergence of new tools and language of administrative reform, ranging from outsourcing to privatisation, and from data management to executive agencies. The overall assessment is that government has ‘cost a bit more and worked a bit worse’.

Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures and the Struggle for Political Reform

How the French Think: An Affectionate Portrait of an Intellectual People

Maginificent and Beggar Land: Angela and Allan Huxley

The history of contemporary democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is a complex one, featuring instances of both democratising against the odds as well as in fragility or in irreversible conditions. This book develops a framework which assesses the costs and benefits of democratisation to incumbent leaders as a way of explaining choices between repression and reform. Drawing on a diverse case studies ranging from the durability of post-independence multiparty systems in Botswana and Mauritius, successful transitions in South Africa and Ghana, and democratic collapse in Mali and South Sudan, Democracy in Africa charts the nuances of what facilitates political liberalisation, and how the balance between inclusion and competition has been found (or not) in all these different political contexts.

To the outsider, the prominence of the intellectual – the philosopher, novelist and writer – is one of the hallmarks of features of French culture, and a contrast to the anti-intellectual populism that dominates a significant number of elected officials. This book surveys the past four hundred years of high culture, drawing out the style, rhetoric, and discursive techniques that characterise French intellectual life. Paradigm obsolescence in these special characteristics: the tension between liberal claims to construct a universal political order and the need to establish a more meritocratic and universalist in tension. How the French Think demonstrates how the French national imagination has been constructed – and in doing so, how the French think about the future.

Since the end of its three decade-long civil war in 2002, Angola has become a poster child for the Africa Rising narrative. Sustained growth and the breakneck pace of postwar reconstruction have been driven by oil revenues, while a politeness that once espoused Marxist-Leninist austerity now welcome Chinese credit in exchange for commodities. Magnificent and Beggar Land charts to these rapid changes – as well as the social stratification and widening inequality that has accompanied postwar prosperity, the rise of oligarchic capitalism, and the concentration of political power. It details Angola’s new relationship with the global world, professional service firms and international institutions alike, and the complexities of state formation after colonialism, Cold War and civil war.

Limits of Islamism: Jamaat-e-Islami in Contemporary India and Bangladesh

The relationship between globalisation and Islamism is at the heart of this book, which examines how varying socio-economic conditions influence – and limit – the way in which Islamism is expressed as a political ideology. Focusing on the contrasting experiences of the Jamaat-e-Islami movement and its rival in Pakistan, and how the movement’s support is distributed in accordance with wealth and stability. This book critiques the ‘tyrannies’ of electoral democracy and considers alternative mechanisms to enable more equitable development. The book examines the varying impacts of nationalisation and marketization on the political system.

Financialization, New Investment Funds, and Labour: An International Comparison

The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy

The rise of new investment funds – private equity, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth funds – is one of the most significant trends shaping today’s global economy. This edited volume focuses on the effects of fund ownership and popular mobilisation in South Asia, China and Latin America. The book examines how and why some see as both inevitable and morally desirable.

Avoiding Governors: Federalism, Democracy and Poverty Alleviation in Brazil and Argentina

Avoiding Governors: Federalism, Democracy and Poverty Alleviation in Brazil and Argentina is one of the few books that has been able to document the effects of federalism and democracy in Latin America. The book examines the varying impacts of nationalisation and marketization on the political system.

We welcome news of alumni publications and will publish a selection of them in Inspires, on the DPIR website and in our alumni newsletters. Please send information to alumni@politics.ox.ac.uk.
Nancy Bermeo discusses democracy, conflict and the study of politics with Félix Krawatzek

As Nancy Bermeo interacts with her current class of seventeen first-year doctoral students, she sometimes reflects inwardly on her own experience of beginning a dissertation in the late 1970s. At a time when social scientists were still interested in alternatives to capitalism (rather than in its ‘varieties’) she won a Fulbright Scholarship to do fieldwork in post-revolutionary Portugal. Studying with Robert Dahl and Alfred Stepan at Yale, she had become intrigued by the possibility of ‘workplace democracy’ and set off to analyse the vast network of cooperative farms that had grown out of massive land seizures during Portugal’s social revolution. For more than two years she moved between the cooperatives themselves and the policy community in Lisbon observing how citizens attempted to shape their working environment and how political party elites ultimately set the parameters of citizen autonomy.

What remains from this research? Not only her first book The Revolution Within the Revolution: Workers’ Control in Rural Portugal (Princeton University Press, 1987), but a foundational personal experience which nourishes her lifelong interest in the attributes and behaviour of ordinary people in times of change. To this day, Professor Bermeo finds inspirational that she learnt to think then and maintains that nothing substitutes for lived experience on the terrain of political action. She believes that ‘political scientists who distance themselves from the real world of people and politics outside of academia risk writing fiction without knowing it.’ The experience in Portugal also gave Bermeo a deep appreciation for the benefits of fieldwork.

Frequently, it is the small components of a much larger picture which attract our initial interest as researchers, while obscuring more important contextual realities. Moving from the micro-level of cooperative farms to the macro-level of legislative politics in a new democracy allowed Bermeo to expand her research agenda and to begin decades of inquiry into broad questions about regime change, and about citizen mobilisation more generally.

She addresses precisely these issues in a forthcoming Cambridge University Press book titled Parties, Movements and Democracy in the Developing World (co-edited with Deborah Yashar). Drawing on empirical material from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, the book argues that the domestic collectivities at the core of the democratisation process are not necessarily classes (as much of our literature argues) but political parties and social movements.

Bermeo argues that ‘…class actors may be decisive in many situations, but that political collectivities with mixed-class constituencies and their own organizational incentives are usually key to democratisation’s fate. Movements and parties are pivotal because they can mobilize across a wide set of societal cleavages; because class cleavages may not always trump cleavages based on other identities; because no group’s preferences can translate into enduring democratic institutional change without collective action; and because elites associated with movements and parties have designed our democratic institutions for centuries. An exclusive focus on either abstract class actors or material conditions leaves us ill-prepared to understand democratisation in the developing world.’

Oxford University was fortunate enough to attract Professor Bermeo to Nuffield College from a senior position at Princeton. She has found the cosmopolitanism and political and cultural diversity of Oxford especially refreshing and the bedrock of a stimulating working environment. But as all of us know, Oxford is also a place of important rules written in small font in arcane handbooks of JCRs, MCRs and SQRs. She still remembers the one High Table she rushed to without her gown. As she entered the SQR a college visitor mistakenly took her for a waitress and asked whether she could bring him a glass of wine.

In addition to completing a recent study of democratic backsliding, Nancy Bermeo is researching the relationship between democracy and war. Charles Tilly argued persuasively that wars made states but Bermeo asks, can wars make democracies too? At first glance this question might seem paradoxical. After all, we associate wars with violent destruction and chaos. However, there is historical scholarship which points to the possibility of an accelerated process of institution building through the experience of war. And still other work points to cases where wars have led to positive ideational and behavioural change.

Clearly, different sorts of wars have different effects, so we should examine which kinds of wars leave legacies that are helpful to building democracy and which leave legacies that are harmful. The literature on democratic regime change has by and large neglected war as an explanatory variable and has privileged internal conditions (such as level of wealth and education, income distribution) or international factors. Bermeo highlights the need to take ‘conflict history’ into consideration when predicting democratic durability.

Drawing on an original data set covering all wars and all new democracies emerging between 1946 and 2011, she finds that wars rarely give rise to new democracies but that, when they do, the resulting democracies are more durable than their counterparts emerging in peacetime. Studying a selection of cases across six decades and four continents she concludes that this durability advantage arises when wars weaken authoritarian incumbents, transform the armed forces and lay the foundation for viable party competition.

In addition to this, she has completed a recent study on the book’s final sections revolve around the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. Her reading of events leaves little ambiguity. These are not the kinds of wars that produce characteristics helpful to democratisation. The mobilisation of exclusive identities leaves little room for a transformation of armed groups into the sorts of inclusive political parties that could sustain democracy.

Conflicts based on revolutionary struggles and which give rise to parties which can compete on a left-right spectrum are better able to mediate their conflicting interests and provide a better base for democratic competition.

When asked to look towards the future of comparative politics in Britain, Professor Bermeo speculates that the subfield will (and should) continue its links to economics and statistics, but that future collaboration with disciplines such as history, psychology, geography, and urban studies should gain in importance too.

Nancy Bermeo believes that Oxford’s interdisciplinarity and methodological diversity is in its greatest advantage. Balancing scholarly autonomy with an atmosphere that encourages increased collaboration between faculty and students across fields and methodologies will ‘enable us not simply to continue doing good work but also to serve the public good as persons of great privilege.’

Nancy Bermeo
Professional Fellow and Nuffield Chair of Comparative Politics

Félix Krawatzek
British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow
Charting the rise of digital media

Rasmus Kleis Nielsen discusses the Digital News Report, a detailed examination of how consumption of news is changing over time, and what this means for the future of the media.

For half a century, people have relied on television and newspapers for information on what is happening in the world. But today, the rapid rise of digital media is fundamentally changing how we get our news. Print newspapers are in decline, television viewership is eroding, and legacy news organizations face a battle to retain audiences and advertising revenue.

As audiences turn away from traditional distributors and formats and towards digital sources, including social media, who are the new players that people are looking to for information? And what do these changes mean for news media’s political and social role? These questions are important and pressing ones for political scientists, as well as for the media industry and society at large.

The Digital News Report, produced by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk), part of the Department of Politics and International Relations, provides some of the answers. It is the world’s largest international comparative study of how people across the world consume their news, how global media is changing, and what the trends and implications are.

The Digital News Report

The report first launched in 2012, and in 2016 covered 28 countries. We’re expanding this year with support from a range of sponsors and in 2016 the report will include findings from 26 countries.

In 2015, we showed how audiences across the world have embraced digital media, with a rapid rise in people using websites and increasingly social media and smartphones to get news. We also documented key differences between countries and how news audiences differ across the globe. Countries including the US, the UK, Japan and the Nordic countries are the heaviest users of digital, while audiences in Germany and Southern Europe have been slower to adapt to digital practices.

Taking a deeper look at some of the differences, the ways in which people engage with their news organisations is markedly varied. While some regions, including the US and some parts of Southern Europe, have very high levels of engagement, with media playing a crucial role in how audiences engage with social and political life, engagement levels were much lower in Northern Europe and Japan, where people use social media far less to discuss news, comment on current affairs and take part in political campaigns.

It turns out that the rise of digital media is playing out very differently in different countries, with different implications for the news media, and for their political and social role. Three trends from recent years are worth highlighting in particular—the rise of mobile media, the growing role of social media as a platform for accessing news, and the mounting challenges faced by the news business—all with potentially profound implications not only for the news industry, but also for the role news media play in society.

Mobile – the defining device for news media

One of the standout elements of 2015’s report was the increasingly important role of smartphones as the defining device for online media. News accessed through smartphones jumped significantly between 2014 and 2015, from 37 per cent to 46 per cent.

The increasing importance of smartphones presents a challenge for news organisations on several levels; from an editorial point of view, many are struggling to move on from desktop-specific content, and from a business point of view it is harder to sell effective advertising on the small screen. Add to that the challenge that access to content is increasingly dominated by third party platforms like Facebook, Apple and Google, and it is clear we will see further changes in the way news organisations approach mobile content and its distribution.

Social media – an increasingly important platform for news

When it comes to third party distribution of news stories through social media, Facebook is increasingly important. In 2015, 41 per cent of our respondents said that they use the network to find, read, watch, share or comment on news stories—more than twice its nearest rival, YouTube. The importance of third parties for news distribution is only increasing.

2015 saw the launch of major new initiatives like Facebook’s ‘Instant Articles’ and Google’s ‘Accelerated Mobile Pages’. Major players including The New York Times, the Guardian and the BBC have already signed up to partner and share their content.

What are the implications for news organisations? They face some tough decisions. Do they sign up to working with a powerful ally – but lose some of their content control and distinctive identity – or do they attempt to remain completely independent, potentially missing out on the benefits of boosting their reach?

How to make it pay?

In the UK, we recently witnessed the announcement that The Independent is closing its print version to focus on digital media and the Guardian has announced it is closing its print version to focus on digital media and the Guardian has announced it is closing its print version to focus on digital media. This model worked well for many, especially for the largest titles and for those with local and regional monopolies. It made some newspapers very profitable and enabled the industry as a whole to invest significant sums in journalism—an estimated 65 per cent of the money invested in newspaper production in the UK comes from newspapers.

This model is, however, under increasing pressure. Print circulation has declined for years and the decline has accelerated as especially younger people prefer digital media. And online, news providers have struggled to find sustainable business models. Both of the two traditional sources of revenue, sales and advertising, are under pressure. Sales are under pressure because most people are happy with the news they can get for free online and disinclined to sign up to a digital subscription. Advertising is under pressure because advertisers can buy cheaper online advertising from large platforms like Google and Facebook and increasingly invest here rather than with publishers.

The wider implications

These changes in how people find and access news, and in the business of news, are important not only for news media themselves, but also for political scientists and for decision-makers at all levels of society. News media are an integral part of how modern politics operate, so any change in the media will have wider political implications (confronting political science with the challenge of making sense of new types of players like platforms such as Facebook and Google that enable citizens even as they challenge (incumbent institutions), and these are explored in dozens of studies based on data from the Digital News Report.

Decision-makers are very conscious of these changes too, so the research behind the Digital News Report is used well beyond the academic realm itself, by news media executives as well as by regulators and policy makers from many of the countries covered in the report.

As our media continue to change, the Digital News Report will continue to track these changes in where and how people get news in different countries, how these changes impact the practice of journalism and the business of news, and what the wider social and political implications are.

How can I access this?

The Digital News Report with data going back to 2012 for some countries can be explored, along with a series of essays and interactive media at digitalnewsreport.org.

Rasmus Kleis Nielsen
Director of Research, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism

Available to download from www.digitalnewsreport.org
On the occasion of his retirement, OxPol is taking the opportunity to celebrate the work of Professor Iain McLean, who, aside from seven years at Newcastle University and three at the University of Warwick, has been a Fellow of Oxford since 1969. Many of our alumni will have been taught by Professor McLean and among those who haven’t, many more will have read his many contributions to the field.

Professor McLean continues to be a frequent commentator in the media, and his expertise has been sought by government on subjects as wide ranging as devolution, government responses to disaster, church and state constitutional reform, electoral systems and taxation.

The blog series will offer analysis and discussion of Professor McLean’s work, as well as exploring new developments and topical issues in his areas of research. As ever, contributions and comments are welcome!

For more information about forthcoming courses, visit springschool.politics.ox.ac.uk
Meeting Minds
Alumni Weekend in Oxford 2016
16 – 18 September 2016

Our Meeting Minds: Alumni Weekend in Oxford events showcase the best and brightest of the University – past, present and future, with a range of centrally-organised events to choose from, together with a wealth of college-organised activities.

They also offer an opportunity to revisit your University and see what has changed since you left. Our small-group tours explore ‘hidden’ Oxford and offer unique insights into the city and University across the ages. There are also a variety of social events to complement the academic programme.

DPIR Sessions at the Alumni Weekend

Dr Lucas Kello
The Cyber Threat: Problems of Strategic Adaptation

This talk will explore the consequences of cyberweapons for international relations and security. It will discuss previous technological revolutions to draw lessons and insights on contemporary problems; evaluate current debates about the new technology’s security implications; and provide practical insights for the resolution of these problems and debates in practice.

Dr Lucas Kello is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Cyber Studies Programme, DPIR.

Professor Daniel Butt
Does Inequality Matter? Social Justice and Political Theory

By some measures, contemporary Britain is now more unequal than at any time since the Second World War. This session will examine the moral significance of inequality within and between modern states, and ask what we might be prepared to do, and not to do, in the name of egalitarianism.

Dr Daniel Butt is Associate Professor of Political Theory and Fellow and Tutor in Politics, Balliol College. He is director of the Centre for the Study of Social Justice, DPIR.

DPIR ALUMNI EVENT
Fed Power
The politics of central banks after the US presidential election

Wednesday 16 November
Oxford and Cambridge Club, Pall Mall, London

This evening event will allow alumni the opportunity to discuss with fellow alumni the implications for finance and politics of the US Presidential election, and to hear from a panel of DPIR academics and leading practitioners, chaired by Professor Desmond King, Andrew Mellon Professor of American Government.

The BRICS Countries

Saturday 4 March 2017
Manor Road Building, Oxford

Dr Timothy Power and Dr Ricardo Soares De Oliveira will lead a day of discussion on the BRICS countries – their politics, economics, their place on the world stage and their prospects for the future.
In researching social movements, it’s often useful to distinguish between participants who stand to benefit if the movement achieves its goal, and participants who don’t. Theorists usually call the latter ‘conscience constituents’. They are thought to be important because they sometimes help to get movements started when the beneficiaries are unable to co-operate sufficiently to achieve their goal.

This lack of co-operation is quite common, even where there are many beneficiaries. Theorists usually call the latter ‘conscience constituents’. They are thought to be important because they sometimes help to get movements started when the beneficiaries are unable to co-operate sufficiently to achieve their goal.

This lack of co-operation is quite common, even where there are many beneficiaries. Theorists usually call the latter ‘conscience constituents’. They are thought to be important because they sometimes help to get movements started when the beneficiaries are unable to co-operate sufficiently to achieve their goal.

One strong possibility is that conscience constituents are motivated by what I term a disjoint norm of service to others. Existing theory mistakenly treats it as a useful source of free energy, without considering where it comes from, or what costs it creates. Conscience itself, after all, is both personally owned, and also located outside us. This is how it motivates people, but also why it can be awkward for social movements to make use of it. In the second orientation, the wrong consists in the denial of autonomy or selfhood. In righting it, the work must be done by those who have themselves been wronged, because only by acting for themselves can they repair the injury to their selves. Here too, the conscience constituent may seem out of place.

Each orientation, I argue, has its own characteristic set of dilemmas. When neglected interests are at issue, the dilemmas concern accountability. When the denial of self-expression is at issue, the dilemmas concern authenticity. When the issue is empowerment, the dilemmas concern agency and belonging. Each orientation, I argue, has its own characteristic set of dilemmas. When neglected interests are at issue, the dilemmas concern accountability. When the denial of self-expression is at issue, the dilemmas concern authenticity. When the issue is empowerment, the dilemmas concern agency and belonging.

In each orientation, there are also variations in ambition. In more ambitious work, the conscience constituents’ own selves come into consideration. Ambition problematises the conscience constituent’s authority as a judge of other’s interests, or their identities, or their capacities and skills. Unambitious work only requires the conscience constituent to consider and accept changes in others; ambitious work that he should consider and accept changes in himself.

The privileges and connections that make the conscience constituent valuable to social movements can therefore sometimes be a curse. It is not exactly that conscience constituents are more or less useful in any particular type of movement, but that their value may vary by orientation; ambition, as well as across the life cycle of a social movement, and according to long run historical changes.

To test these ideas, I consider a set of British historical case studies over the last two hundred years. As well as helping to answer the question of why conscience constituents are present or absent, and what problems they solve and create, I hope that these case studies also throw light on some intriguing historical questions.

Why, for example, has it sometimes (but not always) been possible for workers to be represented in Parliament by middle class Labour MPs? Why was the anti-slavery movement in Britain such a successful mobilisation despite the striking absence of slaves? Why did some Indian anti-colonial activists seek out the help of British supporters, but others reject such help even when it was offered and potentially useful to them? Why did solidarity among activists create and sustain the contemporary Global Justice Movement? And are there emerging sorts of social movement, in which conscience constituents can participate without difficulty?

I am building a website to present the first results of this project. It will be accessible later this summer via the departmental website.

**Nick Owen**

Associate Professor of Politics, Praelection in Politics, Queen’s College