2014

INSPIRES

The Magazine for Oxford Politics and International Relations Alumni

UNIVERSITY OF
OXFORD

A LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

Welcome to the fourth issue of *Inspires*, the alumni magazine for the University of Oxford's Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR). We hope you enjoy it. We are pleased to bring you again a sample of the wide-ranging research activity of DPIR members, including two articles by DPIR alumni, Sundeep Waslekar and Tim Soutphommasane. Three alumni also kindly agreed to share with you their accounts of 'Life after DPhil', continuing the success of the 'Life after PPE' and 'Life after History and Politics' features in previous editions. We have a new Head of Department, Elizabeth Frazer; please find her 'Welcome' on page 4.

It has been another very active year for the DPIR alumni programme. It was a pleasure to meet so many of you at the November 2013 alumni event 'The Engagement of Theory'. One delegate remarked, 'Saturday was a splendid day and quite as good as my highest hopes. Thanks to everybody for making it happen. It stimulated my thinking on a wide range of topics.' We know that many alumni also enjoyed the joint OUP/DPIR 'Oxford@ISA' reception, which was held at this year's International Studies Association convention in Toronto, and the Toronto Oxford-Cambridge Society event which took place on the same day. Planning is underway for our next Oxford event, 'Political Economy in Times of Crisis', which will be held on Saturday 29 November – please see further details on the back cover of this magazine. We hope to hold many more events of this kind, not only in Oxford, but further afield. We have received generous offers from alumni to speak at events over the past year. These have been noted with appreciation, and we will respond to them at the earliest opportunity.

Please keep sending us your alumni profiles, 'class notes' (for the online *Alumni Newswire* newsletter), news and publications, and join our ever-growing alumni networks. We will post material online and publish it in the newsletter wherever possible. We are very grateful to those of you who have returned the form enclosed with last year's issue of this magazine, informing us of changes in contact details and of your current employment. This latter information is particularly important for DPIR as our alumni achievements encourage the most talented scholars from across the world to apply to study here; it is also inspirational for our current students to learn of alumni career destinations. Thank you for your help with this.

We will mention here that DPIR is currently working to redevelop its website, with the launch of the new site due in Michaelmas term. Your suggestions for improvements to the alumni webpage will be warmly appreciated.

We welcome feedback on this issue, suggestions for the next and we look forward to hearing from you.

Kate Candy and Stuart White
alumni@politics.ox.ac.uk

CONTENTS

GET IN TOUCH

Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom

Email: alumni@politics.ox.ac.uk
Phone: +44 (0)1865 278700

Follow us on twitter
@Politics_Oxford

Elizabeth Frazer became Head of Department on 1 January this year. In this welcome note she reflects on the value of departmental research and initiatives and looks forward to our next alumni event later this year

Welcome to our 2014 issue of *Inspires*, in which you will find articles that show how the research conducted by department staff engages directly with the events of the world: changes in the European Parliament, International Relations of the Middle East, intergenerational justice, constitutional change and entrenchment, and the relationship between market forces and the welfare state. Two alumni have generously contributed articles: one on the patriotic case for responding to racism, the other on the need for active water cooperation between countries to prevent conflict; three alumni also reflect on their experiences of 'Life after DPhil'.

Questions of relevance, impact and engagement are prominent in all current discussions of university research. Basic research itself cannot be aimed directly at the goal of applicability: the levels of relevance and engagement that are evident in the articles we publish in *Inspires* are more often a by-product of basic scholarship, the development and use of rigorous methods of data gathering and processing, careful interpretation, theoretical reflection and sophisticated analysis. It is the values of validity and truth, clear-mindedness and, technical capability that deliver truly significant findings. Work in our department is rooted in the disciplines of history, philosophy, and the social sciences. The concepts and techniques of these disciplines change - with technologies of research, and also in response to past findings and models which are openly discussed and criticised in publications and in public conferences. These disciplines change all the time, and they intersect with and make differences to the core fields of study of political actions and institutions, standards and values, governmental institutions, and global relations and flows. Students in our department learn from and work with active researchers, whose aim is to help them understand the way theory, methods, and the findings of scholarly and scientific research interact with other, to transform the disciplines over time, to open up new fields of study, and to change human understandings of ourselves and our world. This is the most historically significant form of impact that can be delivered by science and scholarship.

Predicting the impact of one's research, like pre-determining personal happiness, is misguided. But just as living, and engaging, and working, and participating, can make a person happy, so scholarship, and rigorous methods, and engagement with research technologies, and teaching, and subjecting one's work to public

scrutiny, can deliver impact in the sense of making a difference to how institutions are constituted, how organisations function, how people treat each other.

While it might not be possible to determine the impact of research in advance, it certainly is possible to make impact more, or less, likely to happen. Effective engagement is more likely to lead to active consideration of the research by those in related professional practices, and to inform public debate.

The research presented in this issue illustrates connections between theory and practice. The insights drawn from Jane Gingrich's research on the workings of markets or the effects of the interaction between house prices, education systems and citizens' preferences have implications for social policy decisions. Simon Caney's research on intergenerational justice sets out potential challenges to governments to justify how their policies might affect entitlements of future generations. The implications for 'institutional design' have been a topic for discussion amongst the political parties.

Engagement can ratchet up expectation: Louise Fawcett cautions against temptations to provide snap judgements and points to the need at times to provide a corrective to the generalisations and oversimplification of some public commentary on crises and conflicts in complex political regions.

And, of course, the impact path is never one-way: in her analysis of long-term changes in the EU, Anne Deighton describes the 'precious' value to academic progress scholars gain by their interactions with practitioners in sectors of government, business and wider politics.

Speaking of disciplines, methods, and fields of study, those of you who studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics, or History and Politics, in past decades will read Catherine de Vries's article on the new Q-Step Centre with interest. Q-Step is the most significant reform to our undergraduate syllabus since the revision of our core 2nd year papers to include international relations and sociology along with British political history, comparative government and political theory in 1994. The cohort of undergraduates who matriculate in 2014 will, in their first year, attend lectures in basic statistics, and undertake independent analysis of statistical data in a new data laboratory to be located in the Social Sciences Library in Manor Road. In their second year,

their core papers will also involve a course of lectures on quantitative analysis, and work on datasets relevant to the field of study, such as election surveys, data on peace and conflict, and on welfare levels in relation to types of governmental regime. As Catherine de Vries explains, we are one of fifteen such centres nationally, designed to deliver a 'step change' in the levels of statistical literacy in social science graduates.

Some readers might be allergic to neologisms, and dislike the term 'step change' accordingly. Actually, it's not as 'neo' as all that. This term has been used in mathematical and scientific contexts for many decades to name an abrupt, as opposed to a gradual, or indiscernible, or smooth, change in values. These new centres will be testing out the impact of dedicated effort in statistics teaching, fully integrated into the disciplinary framework for study of international relations, government, and political history. We are very much looking forward to the implementation of this project, and we will report on the results of it in due course.

I am also very happy to bring readers' attention to the next alumni event which will give our research staff an opportunity to discuss their work with our old students. In November 2014 Professor David Rueda is organising the third of these conferences. This time the focus will be on our political economists, whose research asks how economic exchanges and flows interact with governmental institutions and forms, and with what human and social consequences. We are very much looking forward to welcoming some of you on that occasion.

I hope that you will all choose to stay involved with the Department of Politics and International Relations in whatever capacity you wish, be it by joining one of our alumni networks or by attending an event. We welcome discussions on how you can help us continue to bring outstanding graduate students to the Department, and further information can be found on page 14. And meanwhile, I hope that you enjoy reading this issue of *Inspires* as much as I have.

Elizabeth Frazer
Head of Department, DPIR,
Associate Professor of Politics,
Official Fellow, New College

The EU in 2014: An Endgame?

Anne Deighton looks back at the history of the EU and asks whether recent challenges now find it in uncharted waters

The EU is an institution born of crisis. It has survived and developed despite being relentlessly tested over its six-decade history. There have been setbacks ('spillbacks'), but internal and international crises have more commonly generated further integration over time. Whether we are now instead witnessing the beginning of end of the EU as an effective 'flexible response' system is one of the biggest strategic questions of the day.

In context: in 1950, there were ambitious plans to build a six-power West European Defence Community that would mimic the new Coal and Steel Community. This took place in the terrifyingly tense atmosphere as the cost of the material and psychological destruction of the World War II was being counted, and communism was spreading. The Defence Community was proposed by the French, and agreed to by the newly created West Germany. In 1954 the French National Assembly dramatically voted down France's own proposal. It seemed like a disaster. But within a year, West Germany had entered NATO; robust and ultimately successful plans were under way for both an economic and an atomic community. By 1958 the Treaties of Rome were signed, creating the forerunner of the EU.

Only five years later, French president Charles de Gaulle personally vetoed the UK's application for membership. What had gone wrong? This veto was followed by another French veto of the UK in 1967. Meanwhile France walked out of the Community's decision-making bodies, and cocked a snoop at NATO by leaving its military command structure. The European scene looked really bleak. Yet institutions did survive and did enlarge and, decades later, the French did come back to NATO.

During the 1980s there was a major budget crisis, and then an EMU-related crisis – this time with the UK as the protagonist. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War pushed away the old, despised but familiar structural props of a divided Europe upon which the EU had been built.

Referendum wars over further treaty proposals dominated the 1990s and 2000s.The atmosphere was of permanent crisis. By 2003, as some Western states disastrously invaded Iraq, the pundits were moaning that 'Europe is in ruins'.

Since 2007, the multifaceted financial and banking crisis has further shaken international institutions and EU member states. Confidence in the management, and indeed in the legitimacy, of the EU is now at an all-time low. It struggles to impose a 'recovery' programme; social 'solidarity' seems a broken reed in the face of bankers' and financiers' assertive re-grouping; populist and nationalist parties garner growing support.

Meanwhile the hoped-for silver bullet of the post Cold War EU – to be a post-modern, outward-looking international power, smart but not armed, ethical and not Realist, lacking post-imperial hubris but effective – has proved hard to sustain. Quiet diplomacy, and some soft power, are perhaps starting to make a mark. But events in the Middle East, Iran, and Africa do not, yet, speak to a EU 'success story'. Indeed, for the EU at least, the Ukraine crisis that erupted in March 2014 is in part a result of the EU's own eastern neighbourhood policy that had followed in a path-dependent way from earlier enlargement policies. This lacked a long-term, strategic aim. We now see very old tensions relating to geopolitical forces in central and eastern Europe bubbling to the surface. Russia draws its own lines in the sand. This is perhaps the most serious strategic crisis the EU has faced.

Some might say: still, nothing really changes. It will all turn out all right. Crisis management is the way in which EU states make big decisions that will affect the lives of all its citizens. The EU is a form of robust co-operation as well as of integration – and it is a lot better than war between Europeans. There is no alternative. We know we cannot agree on the model we want, including who should have membership; federal or confederal solutions; foreign policy priorities; financial policy. It is all a result of not wanting to articulate a clear idea of where we are aiming for – for process trumps 'finalité'. Learning by doing is the hallmark of the EU.

Yet…yet. Others say it really is different this time. The role of external players; the rise of China and the cozily-named BRICS and MINTS; the big international companies; a world in which ideological and religious groupings do not 'fit' territorial boundaries; our own ageing populations and lack of plentiful resources, none of this can be ignored. New technology is shaping the world in ways we do not understand, but we cannot turn our backs on modernisation. If these current crises have deeper roots that stretch into the very nature of advanced international capitalism and its international institutions, perhaps technical solutions will not suffice. Further political and fiscal union may be a leap too far for some. Strategically, relative decline rather than relative growth may well be the new normal in a world in which the US/EU relationship is also no longer quite the default position. These waters are uncharted.

Within the EU, there is a process afoot of sorting out again the differences between the committed, and those who see themselves to be with, but not really of the EU. This is one way to understand the current UK debate that might lead to our own exit from the EU. Our painful and prolonged retreat from an imperial status and identity has clouded much of the debate. This shapes arguments about our own national borders, especially with Scotland. There is no clear indication that a referendum vote either by the Scots, or one on the EU would really clear the air. Is it possible that the EU debate in the UK reveals a deep awareness of the EU's strategic decline, despite the persistent queue for EU membership? I rather doubt it. But this is real, messy, cutting-edge, contested politics.

How do we reflect all this in Oxford? In DPIR we have a flagship two-year MPhil course in European Politics and Society. The course draws on expertise across the Department and also on specialists from Economics, Area Studies, Law, Social Policy, and Modern History. Staff and students are often in stimulating disagreement with each other. We now – belatedly – have a presence in the undergraduate offer in PPE. Seminars and research projects jostle with each other in the Department, in colleges (especially St Antony's and Nuffield, in their different ways), and research institutes. Many from government, business, politics and diplomacy visit Oxford, often informally. Our own outreach as scholars to these sectors is equally precious to our own progress. Many of our students are not only trying to understand the beast, but are searching for positions for work-experience, or employment in the 'real' world of Brussels and beyond. So it seems that the very nature of global political interdependence is echoed in the ideas and networks that we constantly seek to promote in the Department.

Professor Anne Deighton
Professor of European International Politics, Fellow, Wolfson College

Justice
between
generations:
a research agenda

Simon Caney outlines the challenges which lie at the heart of the debate about justice for future generations

Many of the activities that we engage in – and the policies that our governments implement – have profound effects on future generations. That current generations have these kinds of impacts is not new. Government financial decisions concerning say, pensions, housing, health care or the funding of education will have an impact on future generations. In these cases, the impacts are felt primarily by the young or the next generation. However, other phenomena, such as climate change, threaten to affect future generations for hundreds, indeed thousands, of years.

Intergenerational phenomena pose several distinct kinds of challenge. First, they raise important ethical questions concerning what obligations, if any, members of one generation have to future generations. Second, they call for policies that adequately recognise the entitlements of both current and future persons. And, third, they call into question existing political institutions that are often, though not always, resolutely focused on the short term. That is, they raise questions of institutional design.

If we start with the ethical level, one fundamental question is what distributive principle applies to relations between generations. For example, should we seek to ensure that we leave future generations with their basic needs met? This was the objective expressed by the Brundtland Commission's *Our Common Future*[1]. Some might think that this is correct as far as it goes, but that it is too modest. For example, it would permit a state of affairs in which members of one generation have very high standards of living but leave others a world in which they are merely able to meet their basic needs. What could justify this discrepancy? It would seem unfair to future people to leave them so much worse off solely because they appear later in time. Animated by this, some propose an egalitarian principle that claims that we should leave future generations no worse but also no better off than current generations. Others – such as Brian Barry – have proposed a more modest alternative. Barry, for example, suggests that we should seek to leave future generations no worse off than current generations, but that we may leave them better off.

This, however, raises a second crucial question, namely 'better off in terms of what?' Should we, for example, define the metric of justice in terms of people's levels of happiness? Or what Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen call capabilities? Or should the focus be on resources? These questions raise fundamental debates about our vision of a good and just society. If we hold that intergenerational justice is concerned with bequeathing a fair set of opportunities to lead a fulfilling life then it is possible in principle that this is not served by continued economic growth. This would take us to the vision expressed by John Stuart Mill in *Principles of Political Economy*, where he defends the ideal of the 'stationary state'. Such a state, he argues, 'implies no stationary state of human improvement. There would be as much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, and moral and social progress; as much room for improving the Art of Living, and much more likelihood of its being improved, when minds ceased to be engrossed by the art of getting on'. John Maynard Keynes strikes a similar note in his celebrated essay on 'Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren', which argues that once we have attained a certain material standard of living we should focus less on 'the means of life' in order to orient ourselves to what he calls 'the art of life'. The point underlying the perspective articulated by Mill and Keynes is that economic resources are only a means to an end – living rewarding and fulfilling lives. If they are right then what we owe future generations may not require – may even be harmed by – continued economic growth.

Recognising principles of intergenerational justice will, of course, require policies that secure the entitlements of future generations. For example, in the case of climate change there is a powerful case for investing in and transferring clean technologies to enable the least advantaged to develop, but do so in ways that do not trigger dangerous climate change.

In addition to this, though, taking intergenerational justice seriously requires rethinking existing political institutions, both at the national and international level. One striking feature of many existing political systems is their inbuilt short-termism. Humans generally focus on the short term (out of self-interest, pure time discounting, and a tendency to ignore problems which we encounter in an abstract way rather than through personal experience). Furthermore, the incentives facing political actors (notably the electoral cycle, but also the timeframes employed to evaluate people and polices) often encourage myopia.

Given this, one fundamental challenge is to reform existing institutional architectures to incentivise greater protection of future generations. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish between two approaches. One – a constitutional/judicial approach – focuses on the use of constitutional articles and courts or ombudsmen for future generations. For example, a number of constitutions – such as the Brazilian Constitution (Art 225) and the German Basic Law (Art 20a) - now contain articles affirming a commitment to intergenerational equity. There have also been some influential cases – both at the national and international level – where courts have invoked ideas of intergenerational justice.

This strategy can be contrasted with political/legislative approaches. These seek to tackle the issue by designing the legislative process in such a way as to give due protection to the interests of future generations. One step in this direction was taken by Finland, which created a parliamentary Committee for the Future, and made it a permanent committee in 2000. Building on this kind of model one might, however, envisage more radical democratic reforms. If we are to put a due concern with the interests of future generations at the heart of policymaking, then one way of doing so would be to create a legislative process in which (a) newly elected governments are required to issue a statement of how they plan to address long-term problems, (b) there is a Committee for the Future whose role it is to evaluate the long-term implications of current policies, and (c) there is a public deliberative process in which the Government's statement is evaluated by the Committee for the Future (among other bodies) and government ministers are required to give a public justification of how their policies serve the interests of people living in the medium and long-term. This kind of process would not guarantee upholding the rights of future generations – nothing may be able to guarantee that. However, it would make it much harder to ignore the future and would make long-term problems visible in a way that is currently not the case.

There are, of course, other mechanisms that one might explore. The central point is simply that if – as many accept – there are obligations of justice to those who come after us, then we need to start thinking about how best to organise our political system to reflect those obligations.

Simon Caney
Professor in Political Theory,
Director, Centre for the Study of Social Justice,
Fellow and Tutor in Politics, Magdalen College

1 *Our Common Future* (Oxford University Press, 1987) was the report of the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Our_Common_Future

Talking and writing about
Middle East IR

Louise Fawcett explains how an examination of past patterns and practices and engagement with fellow scholars can help inform a balanced analysis of current issues in the Middle East

2011 Egyptian protests: Tahrir Square

One of the perils of academic life, particularly in a research field as fast moving and controversial as International Relations of the Middle East, or 'Middle East IR', is that one is frequently called upon to offer snap opinions and judgements about the latest event or crisis. The Arab Spring uprisings, which started late in 2010 and whose consequences still reverberate today, are an obvious case in point. Iranian foreign policy – including its alleged drive to acquire nuclear capability – is another. So are the current travails of Turkish democracy.

Sitting down to lunch in our congenial Senior Common Room exposes one regularly to such perils. From more familiar colleagues there are the questions about the latest crisis and my thoughts on it. From less familiar colleagues and visitors there are the observations that my topic is 'so interesting', or 'challenging' followed often by a question as to whether or not my views are frequently sought by the media. However an informed opinion is expected.

I am sympathetic to the thirst for knowledge and also keen to see balanced and informed coverage of recent events, but there are also limits to what any working academic can provide. The Middle East is a large,

geographically untidy region, including the Arab states of West Asia and North Africa, as well as the non-Arab states of Iran, Israel and Turkey. Few scholars can pretend to be experts of the whole area. My way of dealing with the problem, which draws on my own background in History and International Relations, is to seek answers to current questions by examining not only contemporary events but also by considering past patterns and practices. History is now fashionably called 'process tracing' by political scientists, but it is really just plain history and I find the lessons of history particularly helpful to explain Middle East developments, and also to avoid getting things wrong. And academics (and policymakers) frequently do seem to get things wrong when it comes to the Middle East.

Consider Iran. I wrote my first book on Iran in the Cold War and, though one might reasonably argue that Iran during the Cold War was an altogether different state from Iran since the Revolution – not least because it was closely aligned to the West, it is surprising just how many parallels can be drawn between the Islamic Republic and the Shah's Iran. For example, the ambition to assume an important regional position,

to be a regional leader or 'hegemon' is one that has characterised both pre-revolution and post-revolution Iran. This desire derives from the country's history and cultural identity, from its size, location and resources. Iran operates in a sensitive and highly competitive regional environment and this has led to heightened sense of insecurity and vulnerability.

Take another issue, that of democratization. For a long time, political scientists and commentators have alternatively puzzled at or despaired of the apparent hostility of the region towards the processes of political liberalisation. The Middle East is seen as an outlier having evidently missed Samuel Huntington's *Third Wave of Democratization*. Reasons for this have often been sought in the region's so-called exceptionalism, with Islam and Arabism often invoked to explain the democracy gap. The political economy of rentierism has been also implicated in the resilience of authoritarian rule. When the Arab Spring started there was therefore considerable surprise, even scepticism, that Arab peoples had found their voice and were demanding human dignity and basic freedoms.

"We need to look beyond such simplifications, to reject standard narratives and examine the facts on their own terms. This means looking at the region from the inside out as well as the outside in."

The Arab Spring, however, is less surprising if one considers the experience of the modern region over the long twentieth century. Yes, there is little democracy judged by Western standards, but plenty of close encounters with democratic practices and liberal values, from the first Ottoman constitution in the late 19th century, or the Iranian constitution of 1906, to the multiple episodes of attempted and mostly thwarted liberalisation that have punctuated Middle East history since the end of the Second World War. That these have hitherto failed to produce more stable democratic outcomes in most of the region (Israel and Turkey are the outliers here) does not mean that the region is inherently inhospitable to democracy, as the scholar Elie Kedourie once argued. Whatever the outcome of the Arab uprisings, the region is unlikely to return to the status quo ante. Progress towards greater pluralism has been made.

With democratization, as with Iran, or indeed with the widely misused label 'political Islam', so diverse and complex as to be devoid of significant meaning, it is important to avoid the generalisation and oversimplification that is present in much public commentary. We need to look beyond such simplifications, to reject standard narratives and examine the

facts on their own terms. This means looking at the region from the inside out as well as the outside in. This is something I have always endeavoured to do in my own work. One of the more recent publishing ventures I have been involved in is precisely an attempt to keep abreast of major developments in the International Relations of the Middle East by engaging with different scholars and a variety of perspectives[1]. IR theory tends towards grand assumptions: it can be a huge simplifier. But in exploring issues ranging from the colonial legacy and regional economy to political identities and regional security, my fellow authors and I have tried to demonstrate the need for careful, balanced analysis and considerable nuance in writing about the International Relations of the modern region. I attempt to follow the same principles in my lunchtime conversations!

Louise Fawcett
Associate Professor of Politics,
Wilfrid Knapp Fellow,
Tutor in Politics,
St Catherine's College

1 *International Relations of the Middle East*, 3rd edition (Oxford University Press, 2013)

LIFE *after* DPhil

The DPIR doctoral student community currently numbers 221, with DPhil alumni going on to a wide range of academic positions and careers in the public and private sectors both nationally and globally. Three DPhil alumni share with *Inspires* how the DPhil influenced their lives and career choices.

> The DPhil changed my life. Thereafter, my career alternated between diplomacy, research management, writing and teaching.

David Malone Magdalen College 1995

In 1994, at 40, I was concluding a Canadian ambassadorial term at the UN, chairing its peacekeeping committee. I had sat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 1990, enjoying a ring-side seat to the profound shift in international relations as the Cold War ended. My years in New York left me with much still to explore on the UNSC and the knowledge that I needed a PhD to be taken seriously within academic circles. I applied to Princeton and Oxford, the two universities that then harboured the most eminent professors active on the UNSC.

Having lived in the US a good deal, Oxford was more of an adventure. My terrific supervisor, Adam Roberts, understood my dilemma: I could take only two years for this project for financial and career momentum reasons. Thanks to him, we established a rhythm of meeting every two weeks when I would hand over my scribblings, which he then turned around with his comments two weeks later. We maintained this intense pace until I had completed the research (some of it in Haiti, Miami, Washington and New York) and writing, within 21 months. Many others were tremendously helpful, not least the administrative genius of the Centre for International Studies, Marga Lyall. Class-mates and professors offered insightful views and advice. The thesis conclusions only came together thanks to a unifying framework suggested by Andy Hurrell.

The DPhil changed my life. Thereafter, my career alternated between diplomacy, research management, writing and teaching. With a year of graduating in 1997, I was asked to lead a New York-based think tank focused on UN issues, the International Peace Academy. Our wonderful young team there made a significant difference to UN delegations, to Kofi Annan and his associates, and in academic publication. Meanwhile, I began to teach at the NYU Law School, initially with the late, great Tom Franck. I have been associated with it ever since. My writing focused on multilateralism, great power relations, the political economy of civil wars and conflict prevention.

In 2004, I returned to Ottawa to oversee Canadian economic and multilateral diplomacy (while completing a book dissecting the UNSC's contentious engagement with Iraq since 1980). From there, in 2006, I moved to India as Canada's envoy in 2006, a life-altering, tremendously exciting engagement that led on to a book on India's international relations published in 2011, and currently to co-editing with two Indian friends the Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy.

Five years of directing Canada's aid agency funding research in the developing world revived my early interest in development, also yielding a collective volume, International Development: Ideas, Experience and Prospects (OUP).

These ventures, and my current job in Tokyo overseeing a UN confederation of 16 research institutes around the globe, have allowed me to indulge my curiosity; work with younger research partners; and initiate ambitious research projects (while often serving my government).

I'm still in regular touch with Adam, Andy and others at Oxford and always look forward to seeing my invariably younger student friends from Oxford days.

> Seminars at Number 10 Downing Street can't be approached as if they were the Nuffield Political Theory Group.

Victoria Nash Magdalen College 1993

It's fair to say my family expressed little excitement at the prospect of my achieving an Oxford DPhil in Political Theory. Although undoubtedly proud of my scholarship place at Nuffield, and pleased that I was specialising in something I found rewarding, they did rather wonder what exactly I was going to do at the end of it all. Would I get a job? A good job? A job relevant to my research? Eighteen years on, looking back on a career that's spanned both think tank and academic employment, the answer to all three questions is a resounding yes, but it's by no means the path I would have expected when starting the degree back in 1996.

For a start, there's still a misconception that doctoral research must inevitably lead to an academic post. In reality, fewer than half of all those with a PhD will make it into academia in the long-run, if figures reported in THE* are to be believed. But this needn't mean that all that research expertise will go to waste. In my case, the prospects of getting a top post in Political Theory were probably slim, and I yearned for a position that would enable me to apply the normative lessons learnt from a thesis on political tolerance and political socialisation. After a round of naïve and probably rather groveling letters, I was lucky enough to gain an interview at the left of centre think tank, the Institute for Public Policy Research. At a time when questions of 'community' and social cohesion were high on the political agenda I was given the chance to run my own project, essentially applying the policy lessons learnt in my heavily philosophical thesis.

In retrospect, I learnt some tough lessons damn fast. Civil servants and ministers won't read a 30-page conceptual analysis. Seminars at Number 10 Downing Street can't be approached as if they were the Nuffield Political Theory Group. And most important of all, if you can't explain the importance of your own work, no one else will do it for you. I stayed in the ippr for two terrifying but exhilarating years, and gradually came to realise that whilst I loved helping to broker the application to policymaking of excellent academic research, I was probably more suited to a job a little further away from the grubby coal-face of British politics. Lucky for me, in 2002, I landed a very unusual position at the just-established Oxford Internet Institute (OII), as a Policy and Research Fellow, responsible for connecting OII research with policy and practice. Since that moment, my position has gradually moved back towards the academic end of the spectrum, but the concern with impact remains: I've helped to establish a policy-relevant Masters degree programme, I participate in UK and international Internet governance processes, I research the interplay between competing views of rights online and I teach outstanding future academics and policymakers. But I'm still a political theorist at heart.

*http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/researchers-unrealistic-hopes-of-academic-careers/2007247.article

---

> The ambitions of the research programme inspired by my time at Oxford still motivate and structure my present research.

Terry Macdonald Nuffield College 2000

I work now as an academic in the International Relations (IR) programme at the University of Melbourne. Between completing my DPhil and taking up my present appointment I had a series of academic jobs: as a Junior Research Fellow at Merton College in Oxford; as a Research Fellow at the Australian National University; and as a Lecturer at Monash University. It is hard to apply any neat disciplinary label to my work, but it is perhaps best described as 'international political theory' – capturing its position at the intersection between the mainstreams of 'social scientific' and 'normative' approaches to the theory of world politics. At the moment I am finishing a book on the topic of global political legitimacy; I have worked in the past on institutional avenues for global democratization; and I have some in-progress work on the theory of human rights. In all of this research my focus is on problems of political legitimacy as they arise beyond the borders of sovereign states.

An academic career might seem the least surprising of all paths to follow after the DPhil, though when I came initially to Oxford to study IR that was not in fact my intention. I embarked on the MPhil in IR at Oxford under the rationale that this degree would open doors to interesting policy and activist work as well as to further academic research. But once there my resistance to academic life – a result of being the child of academic parents! – was quickly subdued, and I transitioned into the DPhil two years later.

Oxford turned out to be an ideal place to pursue my research interests at a DPhil level – and not only because of the strength, size, and vibrancy of both the IR and the normative political theory groups. The other key advantage of the Oxford environment for me was the way these empirical and normative sub-fields of political study are intellectually integrated – both within teaching programmes, and within the research questions and themes that structure informal networks of conversations and projects across this scholarly community. In this environment I found it possible to pursue (or at least aspire to) the kind of research programme in which I was, and am still, most interested: problem-centred, normative, and empirically engaged. I still haven't come across any other department in the world where this would have been possible to the same degree as it was in Oxford.

The ambitions of the research programme inspired by my time at Oxford still motivate and structure my present research – though I am very aware that most of the work required to fulfil these ambitions lies still in the future. I have had two children since leaving Oxford, and the progress of my academic work has slowed during these years as a result. They visited Oxford with me once, three years ago, and they mostly liked the swans – white, instead of black like all the swans at home in Melbourne. I hope that I can bring them back again when they are a little older, and share with them some of the other (non-swan) pleasures of the place, of which I consider myself a very grateful beneficiary.

INVESTING in the FUTURE

THE NEXT GENERATION OF SCHOLARS IN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DPIR asks for your help in recruiting the best of the next generation of scholars and leaders

Why support postgraduate study in Politics and International Relations?
Most importantly, we need the next generation of scholars, who will teach future generations of undergraduates. Scholars like those who teach at Oxford – who may have taught you when you yourself studied here – need to be nurtured, taught to research, and taught to teach.

Additionally, postgraduate study generates a much wider group of social scientists and political theorists with the skills of research, data-gathering, hypothesis testing, modelling and programming, conceptual analysis and normative theory building. These skills – put to good use right across the public and private sectors, in civil society, in the UK and worldwide – are not, for the most part, honed through undergraduate study alone. There is a need for a graduate degree.

But graduate study only justifies itself when built on excellence. Our Department is one of the best in the world. Top-quality research, teaching future scholars and intellectual leaders, and real-world impact are interlinked in rich and complex ways, which can be illustrated by the tremendous success of our alumni and the way in which their work and ideas impact on the world. Oxford too is uniquely placed to combine the highest level disciplinary teaching and research skills with deep knowledge of the regions of the world, allowing us to understand different regional, religious and cultural perspectives – increasingly vital in our globalised world.

In DPIR we train the very best. To enable the very best to study at Oxford we must support our brightest graduates irrespective of their financial situation. We need above all to retain in Oxford the best of our Master's-level students to generate the best doctoral research and publications. That demands fully funded pathways from Masters degree to doctoral thesis. Graduate study is costly. Lack of finance is too often today the cause of promising young scholars declining their places for postgraduate study at Oxford. Our reputation and quality helps to make up for the funding gap but without proper funding regimes to support postgraduate study in Politics and International Relations, the best postgraduates will simply not be able to study in the UK.

Help us become fully 'needs blind' and recruit the best of the next generation of scholars
Our goal is competitive funding packages for our best applicants at graduate-entry level. Further information is online at
www.politics.ox.ac.uk; alternatively please give us a call to discuss how you can help. Thank you.

Elizabeth Frazer
Head of Department, DPIR,
Associate Professor of Politics,
Official Fellow, New College

David Hine
CUF University Lecturer in Politics,
Student, Christ Church

If you would like to discuss how you can support DPIR, please contact us as follows:

By phone: +44 (0)1865 278700
By email: alumni@politics.ox.ac.uk

The Patriotic Case
for Responding to Racism

Tim Soutphommasane argues that understanding patriotism as a civic virtue can empower citizens to counter racism in society

Patriotism means a love of country. But what does it mean to love a country? And what kind of patriotism is appropriate for a society with a multicultural population?

These were questions I explored in my research as a political theorist – first in my MPhil and DPhil, and then subsequently as an academic in Australian universities. But they continue to feature in the background of my current work as Australia's Race Discrimination Commissioner. My brief as Commissioner is to educate Australians about racial discrimination and to be an advocate for multicultural harmony.

Many would say that patriotism should be the last sentiment I should be entertaining. After all, many who describe themselves as patriotic believe that their country is not only the best in the world but must be protected jealously from any criticism.

It is in this manner that patriotism can morph into jingoism. Loving your country may mutate into a belief in your country's superiority and into an aggressive imposition of that belief on to others. Indeed, some see no significant difference between these two terms. George Bernard Shaw, for instance, defined patriotism as 'your conviction that [your] country is superior to all other countries because you were born in it'.

Real-world experience shows that patriotism can be a vice. National pride does not always express itself in edifying ways. Across Europe,

populist parties of the far right and extremist street movements have been growing in strength. Racism and xenophobia continue to thrive. Here in Australia, during the past two decades a reactionary nationalism has seeped into the mainstream consciousness. Since the 2005 Cronulla Beach race riot in Sydney (when a 5,000-strong, flag-waving mob attacked Australians of Middle Eastern appearance), some members of the Australian public have embraced the national flag with jingoistic enthusiasm.

We may understandably regard patriotism with scepticism. In an increasingly globalised world, many suggest that it would be better for us simply to celebrate our common humanity, to become citizens of the world – and not worry about our country being special.

I disagree. We shouldn't reject all forms of patriotism because of its possible dangers. Rather, we should be clearer about what kinds of patriotism we are willing to accept. Because patriotism can also be understood as a civic virtue.

Admittedly, coming to this view requires a number of steps.

First, one needs to conceive of patriotism as tied to one's membership of a political community. National stories matter especially in multicultural or multiethnic societies, though not in the conservative sense of cultural assimilation. For example, in the British context, it can be simplistic to believe that cohesion

can only be secured if immigrants have a masterful command of Shakespeare, Trafalgar and Churchill (not least given the questionable grasp the general British population may have of such topics).

Nuance matters: the common ground of citizenship should be defined more by political than by cultural membership. Emphasising the political content of citizenship means there is room for cultural diversity. Rather than a source of division, difference can be a source of enriching a national tradition.

This isn't about having a cultural identikit or crudely appropriating elements of other cultures. It is about recognising there is no one authoritative way to express one's national identity. For instance, few would suggest there is one musical group that could ever be described to be the definitively British band, even if there may be a body of music that is authentically British. In the same way, there can be multiple ways that someone can make sense of their affinity and allegiance to a country.

Second, patriotism need not mean mindless loyalty or chauvinism. A genuine patriotism involves a special concern for the welfare of your fellow citizens and a belief that they must live up to certain standards.

This kind of patriotism sees a national tradition as a living thing – always growing and evolving. It also demands being prepared to criticise your own country when it falls short of being just and good.

Patriotism provides the fuel for the engine of a good society. This doesn't mean embracing a tribal belief in the superiority of one's country. There must be room for reason and reflection. Fundamentally, though, there must be a desire to contribute to the common good and to improve one's country.

It is this particular aspect of the patriotic mindset that can inform the challenge of countering racial discrimination. While in its extreme forms patriotism can itself generate racism, in its more moderate versions it can be part of the solution to bigotry.

From the viewpoint of the patriot, when your country falls short of its best, it may be your obligation to be critical – to demand more of your country or compatriots. After all, if you truly love something, if you wish it to do better, you will want to improve it. When it concerns racial discrimination, this is one thing that members of a liberal society should consider.

Indeed, patriotic citizens have every reason to be moved to act on racism. There is now a considerable body of research that

demonstrates the serious health effects racial prejudice and discrimination can have on individuals. More generally, racism can poison social trust and cohesion. Racism's harm lies in how it reduces its targets to second-class citizens, and how it empowers perpetrators to humiliate others.

These are some of the messages that are at the heart of Australia's National Anti-Racism Strategy, which seeks to empower citizens to stand up to racism, wherever they see it. In addition to tackling systemic dimensions of discrimination, the Strategy seeks to equip individuals and communities to take responsibility for responding to discrimination. It is an ethos that is, in one sense, patriotic. As the nineteenth-century American statesman Carl Schurz put it, patriotism is indeed a case of: 'My country, right or wrong: if right, to be kept right; if wrong, to be set right.'

Tim Soutphommasane
DPhil in Political Theory (Balliol 2004)
*Race Discrimination Commissioner,*
Australian Human Rights Commission

A genuine patriotism involves a special concern for the welfare of your fellow citizens and a belief that they must live up to certain standards.

Constitutional Studies

Entrenchment in UK Law

In 2013 the Department of Politics and International Relations created a Constitutional Studies Programme, which is intended to use social science techniques, including analytic history and comparative methodology, to improve the quality of public and academic debate on the UK constitution and constitutionalism generally. In this article **Scot Peterson**, the inaugural Bingham Research Fellow in Constitutional Studies, outlines themes from his recent research into constitutional and legal entrenchment.

"... legal entrenchment requires political entrenchment to succeed, but political entrenchment can work by itself to make statutes, conventions and other parts of the constitution difficult to change."

Candidates for political office promise to solve problems better than their opponents. Moreover, they promise to do so indefinitely. Particularly after times of turmoil, they attempt to finalise solutions that will last. Following the wars of the seventeenth century and the abdication of James II/VII, in 1688 a convention parliament assembled to confirm William and Mary as king and queen of England. The same parliament passed a Bill of Rights, which guarantees, among many other things, that parliament's laws may not be suspended by the monarch, that taxes must be approved by parliament, and that Protestants have the same rights as others to bear arms. At the conclusion of the act, it says the rights set out there 'shall be declared, enacted, and established by Authority of this present Parliament, and shall stand, remain, and be the Law of this Realm for ever'. And indeed they have.

Examples of these kinds of laws – laws which entrench particular policies or institutions – can be multiplied. The treaty and acts of union between England and Scotland guarantee the continued existence of the established Church of Scotland, the law courts and the educational system in Scotland 'in all time coming'. More recently, the Climate Change Act 2008 attempts to set objectives for carbon emissions reaching to 2050, and the European Union Act 2011 imposes a referendum lock on all future parliaments, requiring a referendum when power is transferred to the EU.

In 1688 the king's abuse of power and the threat of war that had arisen before his abdication provided a back-drop for MPs' desire to entrench the rule of law and the primacy of parliament in the legislative process. In 1707 the Scots recognised that they would be a minority in the new British parliament, and in approaching union they tried (with some, but not complete, success) to entrench religious, educational and legal institutions that had been central to Scottish history, culture and identity. Climate change is notorious as a collective action problem: no one person or nation acting on its own can solve the problem in a fixed period of time. Widespread, long-term commitment is a necessity. And the history of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the Lisbon Treaty showed that politicians could not necessarily be trusted to carry through on the promise of a referendum.

There is a common structure to each of these examples of entrenchment. In each case, one parliament (P1) attempts to protect a future parliament (P3) and its electors from short-sighted or opportunistic policies of an intervening parliament (P2).

According to traditional UK constitutional theory, however, none of this really matters. A.V. Dicey famously wrote, 'That Parliaments have more than once intended and endeavoured to pass Acts which should tie the hands of their successors is certain, but the endeavour has always ended in failure.' Parliament, as a sovereign power, on Dicey's view, simply cannot bind itself. (Of course, since Dicey's time the traditional theory has been weakened by UK membership in the EU and by laws like the Human Rights Act 1998, but it remains a general rule subject to exceptions.) Were all four parliaments that adopted the statutes reviewed above really acting in a way that was futile?

One way of making commitments like these credible is through *strong* judicial review of the kind we see in Germany and the United States. But that is only one way. Even without it, commitments can increase the cost of later parliaments' derogating from them.

At the weakest end of the spectrum are the arguments that can be made by the supporters of the original statute, who can point out to voters that P2 has abandoned it, even if P2 attempts to ignore that fact. If support for the original statute has deteriorated, the costs will be less, but if a popular case can still be made for the policy, then the political costs will be higher. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the legislature can do what parliament did when it enacted the Human Rights Act 1998, permitting the courts to declare that the second statute is incompatible with the first one, while leaving it to parliament to remedy the inconsistency if it chooses. These are all consequences of legal entrenchment—without strong judicial review.

Another kind of entrenchment is purely political, rather than legal, as the statute says nothing about how long the policy is to last. Political entrenchment has been under-theorised, but it may consist in the benefits of coordination on a fixed point (think of the evolution of the office of the prime minister), repeated interactions (working through the whips via the 'usual channels'), and material incentives focused on a particular group or even, occasionally, the population in general. Political entrenchment can reinforce spending programmes like the National Health Service, but it can also reinforce constitutional conventions like the political bar on the monarch withholding the royal assent. Political entrenchment is different from, but may work in tandem with, legal entrenchment. In the cases that Dicey points to, where parliaments were unable to tie their successors' hand, legal entrenchment was not adequately supported by political entrenchment. This can be just as true when a codified constitution is the subject of strong judicial oversight: the United States Supreme Court failed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution to protect African Americans until the middle of the twentieth century, and it approved government internment of Japanese Americans in World War II. Indeed, legal entrenchment requires political entrenchment to succeed, but political entrenchment can work by itself to make statutes, conventions and other parts of the constitution difficult to change.

These are all positive, descriptive points about entrenchment, and their analysis is necessary before moving on to more normative arguments, ascertaining what kinds of entrenchment are desirable. For example, one of the many criticisms of the EU Act imposing the referendum lock is the fact that the Act was not itself adopted in a referendum. It is doubtful whether it makes sense for a bare majority in one parliament to impose super-majoritarian requirements on future legislatures.

Fundamental principles that underlie the stability of constitutional principles in the UK have not been fully theorised, and these are some ways that theories can move forward in the future.

Scot Peterson
Bingham Research Fellow in Constitutional Studies

Recent Publications

Members of DPIR and DPIR alumni produce a wealth of publications. Here is a selection to whet your appetites.

We welcome details of alumni publications and will publish a selection of them in *Inspires* 2015, on the DPIR website and in the *Alumni Newswire* newsletter, due out in Michaelmas term 2014.

Please send information to alumni@politics.ox.ac.uk. Thank you to all alumni who have sent details of their publications over the past year.

Publications marked with this logo have been reviewed on the Politics in Spires blog.

ALUMNI PUBLICATIONS

Learning about Politics in Space and Time
Richard Rose
ECPR Press

This memoir charts the changes in a lifetime, of both politics and the study of politics, of one of the pioneers of public policy analysis in Europe. Co-author of a pathbreaking Nuffield study of the 1959 British general election, Richard Rose recalls the beginning of political 'science' in the Europe of the 1950s and 60s, and his half-century practice of the comparative method. Journeying from desegregation in the American South, to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, and the fall of the Iron Curtain, Rose's travels reflect on the art and craft of learning about politics by the first-hand experience of history.

Mexico and its Diaspora in the United States: Policies of Emigration since 1848
Alexandra Delano
Cambridge University Press

What does migration policy look like from a sending state? This book reviews over 150 years of Mexican immigration to the US and the different ways in which Mexican governments have perceived and sought to manage migration flows northwards and engage with the diaspora in the US. The different pressures on how these policies are made – issue-linkages and the state of its bilateral relations with its superpower neighbour, the relative health of the two economies, and the role and strength of the Mexican diaspora – illustrate the limits and possibilities of different approaches to migration policy.

Inventing the Market: Smith, Hegel, and Political Theory'
Liza Herzog
Oxford University Press

The historical origins and debates over the meaning of the 'market' is the focus of this multiple prize-winning book, which contrasts the thinking of Adam Smith and George Hegel, who saw contrasting implications for freedom and justice in the rise of the market-oriented society. This book examines their differences on matters of social theory and philosophy, not just economics, and also relates their views to contemporary concerns in political theory such as the place of individuals in society and justifications of inequality. The book is based on Dr Herzog's thesis, which won the PSA's Sir Ernest Barker Prize.

Struggling for Recognition: The Psychological Impetus for Democratic Progress
Doron Shultziner
Continuum

What role is there for human nature in theorising about democratic transitions? *Struggling for Recognition* seeks to reintegrate human psychology into history and political science by examining the psychological importance of 'recognition' in the pursuit of democracy: how the desire for positive self-esteem and status alters the calculus of collective action and mobilisation in ways underappreciated by existing theories of social and political change. Case studies of the Montgomery bus boycott and the South African anti-apartheid movement illustrate the political consequences of this pursuit of recognition, especially on pathways to democratic transitions and progress.

DPIR PUBLICATIONS

Representation – The Journal of Representative Democracy Special Edition: 'Courts and Representative Democracy'
Cristina Parau and Richard Bellamy (Co-editors)
Taylor & Francis

This Special Issue explores the worldwide phenomenon of the judicialisation of politics and its relation to representative democracy. Is judicial power expanding to new geographical and policy areas, and if so, what social and political factors are causing this? How do political agents at different levels of governance redesign the judiciary to facilitate or modulate judicialisation? Does institutional design determine actual judicial practice? Is judicialisation just elite self-empowerment? Does judicialisation subvert or promote democracy; some of both; or neither, merely modifying its nature? Empirical and normative logics are applied to these questions by scholars from different perspectives and methodologies.

Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense: An Institutional Perspective
Hylke Dijkstra
Palgrave Macmillan

Security and defence issues are hard cases for the transfer of authority to an international bureaucracy. Yet this is exactly what has happened with the development of the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy, and the creation of new EU institutions to manage newly delegated functions on security and defense. This book, through a focus on principal-agent theory, examines why these functions were transferred, as well as the implications of bureaucratic design and agency in how the EU's security policies are made and implemented.

Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective
Geoffrey Evans and Nan Dirk de Graaf (edited)
Oxford University Press

The relationship between parties and voters has been a long-studied one, in particular the importance of social cleavages of class and religion in explaining electoral choices. This book focuses on how the distribution of the 'supply' of political choices influences the extent of these social cleavages. Rather than social changes being reflected in party choices, the degree of moderation or polarisation offered to voters by parties has important consequences for understanding the social bases of political choices. This argument is made through eleven case studies of advanced democracies and complemented by the use of quantitative pooled time-series data.

Chinese Politics and International Relations: Innovation and Invention
Nicola Horsburgh, Astrid Nordin and Shaun Breslin (edited)
Routledge

How are the challenges of globalisation changing China? This collection of seven chapters uses the theme of 'innovation' to explore the novel changes underway in China and step beyond the common analyses of socialisation and exceptionalism. This discussion of innovation links diverse issue areas, from security policymaking to image and reputation management, and from the search for a distinctive Chinese IR theory to the evolution of online civil resistance. In doing so, it asks both how China is attempting to shape its future, as well as the kind of 'China' being made through these processes.

China's War with Japan, 1937-1945: The Struggle for Survival
Rana Mitter
Allen Lane

In the searing, bloody experience of its war with Japan, the contours of modern China were born. *China's War with Japan* charts how exactly a divided and impoverished country survived in the face of overwhelming odds against a foe that swept through the rest of Asia, and the human toll of this struggle. Importantly, however, this story is also one of how its rise and return to superpower status – not just China's troubled relationship with Japan, but its understanding of its place in the world – are still marked by the legacies of this underappreciated theatre of the Second World War.

Legally Married: Love and Law in the UK and the US
Iain McLean and Scot Peterson
Edinburgh University Press

While the public debate about same-sex marriage is heated and impassioned, little is often said about the historical character of marriage. This book examines same-sex marriage in the context of both changes and continuity in the history of marriage law in the UK and the US. Against a backdrop of increasing legislative activity on same-sex marriage, it addresses important political themes such as the relationship between church and state, the interplay of cultural and religious issues, as well as the different ways and means of safeguarding and protecting minority rights.

Even if citizens do not fully grasp the multidimensionality of market reform, they will pick up on the ideological differences that politicians try to emphasise.

Markets *in* the Welfare State

Jane Gingrich, University Lecturer in Comparative Political Economy and Fellow at Magdalen College, talks with **Gerda Hooijer** about her research into the introduction of market forces to the welfare state and the implications for policymakers, citizens and producers

Since the 1980s many governments have introduced cutbacks and reforms to their welfare state. Social services, in particular, have been greatly transformed by the introduction of market elements, such as voucher schemes to expand parents' choice of schools. Market proponents often portray market reforms as a panacea for all ills related to big government. Market opponents, on the other hand, perceive them as a threat to equality.

Jane Gingrich, a University Lecturer in Comparative Political Economy and Tutorial Fellow at Magdalen College – who recently joined the University of Oxford from the University of Minnesota – adds a much-needed nuance to this debate. In her first book, *Making Multiple Markets in the Welfare State,* she argued that markets vary greatly across countries, across time, and across policy areas. Although some may say that 'a market is a market and all markets produce inequality', Gingrich argues that 'one cannot understand the motives of political actors and the effects of reforms without disaggregating the types of market reform'.

Market reforms differ in how services are distributed to citizens (the allocation dimension) and who has control over the delivery of services (the production dimension). While the former relates to shifting risks and responsibility from the collective to the individual, the latter focuses on whether the state, users of services, or the producers of services themselves have control over the production process. Policymakers, users, and producers will each tend to prioritise different goals, respectively cost efficiency, quality, and profit. Combining these two dimensions leads to six ideal-types of markets with varied consequences not only for who receives benefits from the state, but more broadly, which actors call the shots in the production process.

The type of market which is introduced is not random. It is the result of the motives of political parties, as Gingrich emphasises. Left- and right-wing parties will make different choices based on their ideology. She illustrates this with an example from the UK: 'Both Conservatives under Thatcher and Labour under Blair reformed the NHS in ways that are ostensibly similar – they introduced new and stronger purchasing functions, more autonomy for hospitals, and more oversight of the financial and clinical performance of providers. But the Thatcher reforms created financial incentives for attention to the purchasers' – and thus the central government's – financial objectives; by contrast, Labour expanded funding, introducing greater activity based financing of hospitals and more patient choice. The former shifts

then, largely enhanced central control over the NHS and incentives for attention to financial performance, whereas the latter shifts provided more incentives for a high volume of treatment and lower waiting lists within the NHS.'

In her case studies of the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands, Gingrich found that 'these policies were, for the most part, driven by elite calculations and not directly from demands from middle-class voters. Instead, they were used to attract these voters in a way that was coherent with their traditional partisan goals.' Even if citizens do not fully grasp the multidimensionality of market reform, they will pick up on the ideological differences that politicians try to emphasise.

Social services have played a central role in Gingrich's work, ever since she started working on these questions as a graduate student at the University of California, Berkeley. 'I was interested in social policy, and saw a huge literature on pension and unemployment reform, but less attention to the ways in which policymakers were altering services, and yet services are tremendously important spending items – health and education alone constitute 12-20% of GDP – involve a large workforce and matter a great deal for voters. Understanding these reforms seemed to raise new questions about what the distributive politics of services looked like, and why policymakers, while drawing on a common rhetoric of improved quality and efficiency, often prioritised quite different goals.' The interactions between policymakers, citizens and producers add another layer to the analysis of this complex good, which is 'incredibly important for citizens who are using them and for policymakers who are trying to manage them'.

In her more recent work, Gingrich explores whether the privatisation in the welfare state has affected general attitudes towards redistribution and support among social policy recipients. These attitudes matter because it is often assumed that they inform people's vote choices. In an article with Ben Ansell, Professor of Comparative Democratic

Institutions at Nuffield College, she analyses the interaction between housing prices, education systems and preferences. They find that rising housing prices enabled high-income individuals to target high-quality schools for their children and exclude low-income individuals. The satisfaction with schooling reflected the winners and losers of this segregation, with the rich being more satisfied and the poor significantly less satisfied. Gingrich continues this line of research in an ongoing project with Sara Watson, Assistant Professor at Ohio State University, in which they focus on recipients of incapacity benefits. They investigate whether the joint introduction of conditionality and private provision of these benefits have had any effect on benefit recipients' trust in government and their demands on the state.

Citizens are expected to hold governments accountable for the performance of services. Market reforms, however, may have made it more difficult for them to determine who is responsible for what. This fuzziness has implications for theories of how far voting is based on citizens' evaluations of politicians' past or likely future performance. The informational role of the welfare state and its effect on social policy preferences is the subject of one of Gingrich's latest articles. Her results show that there is a stronger link between the social policy preferences and the vote choice and political preferences of citizens in countries where the role of the state in providing social benefits is more visible than in countries where citizens cannot easily assess what the state is doing.

Jane Gingrich has approached the question of privatisation in the welfare state from many different angles using both qualitative and quantitative methods. She has moved beyond the issues of spending and cutbacks alone and has shed light on the qualitative differences in market reform. The drawings in her office, made by her two children, show that Gingrich has settled into her life at Oxford. Looking back on her first year here, she notes that 'it has been tremendously rewarding. It has been a pleasure teaching the undergraduate students in tutorials, and working with MPhils in DPIR. There is an excellent group of people working on social policy, not just in politics but across the University, providing an exciting intellectual environment.'

Gerda Hooijer
DPhil in Politics

Blue Peace

Sundeep Waslekar argues for a global centre to facilitate active water cooperation between neighbouring countries and thereby prevent wars

Global overview of water cooperation and the correlating risk of war

Water Cooperation Quotient
- 33.33 - 100
- 0 - 33.33
- No Data or No Shared Surface Water
- Risk of War

Since water is at the core of life systems, a decision to cooperate in this sector has implications for electricity, agriculture, urbanisation, livelihood, migration and political stability. Water and peace are interdependent.

In February 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon told the General Assembly that water shortages have fuelled and exacerbated several conflicts around the world. Five years later, in March 2013, he reiterated, 'Water scarcity is a potent fuel for wars and conflicts.' Ban Ki Moon has time and again urged us to treat water as a peace and security issue; but several members of the UN General Assembly are not listening. They would rather define water as an item on the development agenda and no more. Is there a relationship between water, war and peace?

Strategic Foresight Group[1], an international think tank I established a decade ago, has recently published a report based on a survey of 205 shared river basins from 148 countries. Our conclusion is dramatic: any two nations engaged in active water cooperation will not go to war for any reason.

We developed a Water Cooperation Quotient[2] to measure the intensity of cooperation in this area on ten parameters incorporating factors such as the nature of a legal treaty, institutional machinery, data exchange, joint monitoring of flows, energy and environmental projects and high level political interaction. For the equation between water and peace to work, a high score on the Water Cooperation Quotient is essential. A mere agreement for the allocation of water flows is not enough. That is why the Indus agreement between India and Pakistan, and the Euphrates agreement between Iraq, Syria and Turkey, which merely divide rivers on an equal basis, do not remove the spectre of war in South Asia and the Levant. The focus on finding a formula to share the Nile threatens confrontation between Egypt and Ethiopia.

A sceptic might argue that this result shows correlation but not causation. 'Perhaps', the sceptic says, 'countries that already have peaceful relations for other reasons are also able to engage in active water cooperation.' However, if we look more closely, we can see that countries engaged in active water cooperation tend as a result to bury their differences over other issues. Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and Guinea experienced military rules and conflicts until the beginning of the 1970s. In 1972 three of them created the Senegal River Basin Organisation with a supra-national institutional structure and authority. Guinea joined in 2006. When hostilities broke out between Senegalese farmers and Mauritanian breeders in 1989, followed by the 'fossil valley crisis' between the two countries a few years later, the river basin organisation was able to mediate between them and prevent a war. With its dams, electricity, Similarly, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam experience tensions over numerous issues ranging from dams to temples. But the Mekong River Commission, along with the ASEAN economic cooperation regime, forces the four countries to resolve conflicts at a low threshold level.

Europe is a classic example of collaborative water management contributing to comprehensive peace. The Rhine River Commission protects several countries in Western Europe from risks of floods and pollution. This has wider impact. When I asked a senior Dutch diplomat to imagine a scenario where the Rhine River Commission is dismantled and the EU Water Framework Directive is abandoned, he took less than a minute to say, 'This will lead to the dismantling of the European Union, mutual trust and ultimately the threat of war.'

As soon as Cold War was over, the East European countries joined the Danube Commission. The search for peace in the Balkans, after the wars of the 1990s, began with the formation of the Sava River Commission. Finland and Russia have created a bilateral commission to resolve conflicts over water, which also helps build confidence between the two countries to prevent any other conflicts before they blow up.

The Strategic Foresight Group study estimates that there are 37 countries at risk of war, accounting for more than 50% of the world's population. These are precisely the same countries which do not have institutional mechanisms for active water cooperation. Water does not end an on-going war. But active water cooperation can help to prevent war. When water drives peace and good neighbourly relations, experience shows that riparian countries move into a much higher level of cooperation than they could imagine otherwise. Mere trade liberalisation is not enough, since it can be switched on and off easily. Since water is at the core of life systems, a decision to cooperate in this sector has implications for electricity, agriculture, urbanisation, livelihood, migration and political stability. Water and peace are interdependent.

In collaboration with the governments of Switzerland and Sweden and with helpful discussions in the UK House of Lords, we at the Strategic Foresight Group have developed the Blue Peace framework[3] for transforming water from a source of potential crisis into an instrument of peace. This approach crafts the architecture of regional water cooperation, engages mainstream political leaders along with water managers in trans-boundary water discourse and enables politicians to use collaborative institutions to negotiate large trade-offs between water and other public goods. However, much of the work in water diplomacy so far has been regional. There is now a growing realisation that we need a global approach[4].

Everywhere in the world, upper riparian countries claim territorial rights to utilise waters flowing in their jurisdiction for dams and diversions, whereas the lower riparian countries claim historical and environmental rights for unhindered pollution-free flow. We need a global hydro-diplomacy facilitation centre to resolve such disputes.

Whether it is Syria or South Sudan, Palestine or Pakistan, if water infrastructure is damaged in conflict, it takes several years to build. Water cannot be air-dropped like food packets and medicine. We need a political campaign to persuade states and non-state actors to spare water infrastructure in violent conflicts. We also need international agreements to control pollution of water bodies and diplomatic efforts to settle the current debate on various alternative water conventions.

We need to construct global political solutions to water challenges because active water cooperation has the potential to build world peace.

Sundeep Waslekar
PPE (St John's College 1981)
President, Strategic Foresight Group. The Group has worked with or on 50 countries from four continents.

Sundeep Waslekar was conferred D Litt (Honoris Causa) of Symbiosis International University by the President of India in 2011.

1 Strategic Foresight Group, *Blue Peace for the Nile*, 2013, http://goo.gl/LWNAxV

2 Water Cooperation Quotient:

3 Strategic Foresight Group, *Blue Peace for the Nile*, 2013, http://www.strategicforesight.com/publication_pdf/84153Blue%20Peace%20for%20the%20Nile.pdf; and Strategic Foresight Group, *The Blue Peace: Rethinking Middle East Water*, 2011, http://www.strategicforesight.com/publication_pdf/40595Blue%20Peace_Middle%20East.pdf

4 Burkhalter, Didier, *Blue diplomacy – a high priority for Switzerland*, Speech at ministerial roundtable, United Nations, September 2012 http://goo.gl/doHkm5

The
Oxford Q-Step Centre
Generating Enthusiasm for Statistics

Catherine E. De Vries explains the importance of quantitative methods training for DPIR undergraduate students and seeks your help with work placements

We deal with statistics almost in every part of our lives. What is the likelihood that it will rain tomorrow or that the sun will shine? What is the average mark that an Oxford Politics student gets in Finals? We live in a probabilistic world in which certainty is rare. Therefore an in-depth understanding of statistics and research design is of crucial importance when we study Politics. What are the chances that democracy will stabilise in a country that recently survived a coup? Are people more likely to turn out in an election when they have been reminded of their civic duty to vote in a campaign ad? Or is it indeed the case that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other? In order to answer these questions and critically engage with them an understanding of quantitative methods is key.

Last year the Department of Politics and International Relations, in close co-operation with the Department of Sociology, was awarded generous funding from the Nuffield Foundation, ESRC and HEFCE to launch the Oxford Q-Step Centre (OQC). Oxford is one of 15 universities to be selected nationally to host Q-Step, a £19.5 million programme designed to promote a step-change in quantitative social science training. The programme will enable undergraduates across the social sciences to have access to enhanced training in quantitative methods, through lectures and data-labs.

As data become increasingly available, the need for graduates who are able to make sense of them increases too. A thorough understanding of statistics makes our Oxford graduates even more competitive on the job market. The private sector, civil service, non-governmental organisations, media, polling institutes, and many others demand graduates with statistical knowledge. As The *New York Times* put it recently: 'For Today's Graduate, Just One Word: Statistics'[1] .

In order to train our students better, new options in quantitative training will be made available to undergraduates taking the PPE or the History and Politics courses. Hands-on data labs will become a core element of the new teaching programme, allowing students the opportunity to work with datasets within the context of their disciplines. The skills training provided through OQC will be shared widely, with the University of Oxford hosting summer schools about quantitative methods for undergraduates from other UK universities. Oxford academics will also develop open access online teaching materials about quantitative methods for wider audiences.

Expertise and resources will be shared across the higher education sector through an accompanying support programme, which will also forge links with schools and employers. Students who go on work placements to develop their quantitative methods will be able to apply for bursaries through the programme.

To further develop our work placement programme, we turn to our alumni for help. Would your organisation be willing to host some of our undergraduates for a summer work placement? Would you be willing to talk to our undergraduates about the usefulness of statistics in your line of work? If your answer to any of these questions is 'yes', please contact OQC staff at oqc@politics.ox.ac.uk or visit our website http://www.oqc.ox.ac.uk.

Catherine E. de Vries
Director, Oxford Q-Step Centre,
Professor of European Politics and Government in association with Lincoln College

1 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/technology/06stats.html?_r=2&

The private sector, civil service, non-governmental organisations, media, polling institutes, and many others demand graduates with statistical knowledge.

Politics in Spires Blog

Nearly three years ago, DPIR teamed up with Cambridge's Department of Politics and International Studies to create Politics in Spires, a blog highlighting the academic output of the two departments. Since then, the blog has emerged as an invaluable online source for cutting edge research and insightful commentary. As part of our growing success, we are keen to bring more students, staff, alumni, and other stakeholders into the Politics in Spires community.

The blog is a key element in the Department's commitment to knowledge exchange and to communicating our academic output beyond our walls. Through Politics in Spires, our researchers can share their latest ideas in progress, build dialogues with academics engaged in similar topics, highlight recent publications, and comment on current popular debates related to their areas of expertise. The blog offers an opportunity to engage diverse and growing audiences, including policymakers, civil society groups and the media. One of our recent collaborations, with openDemocracy, has resulted in an e-book, *Democratic Wealth: Building a Citizens' Economy*, which you can download free of charge from the site.

We encourage you to take a look at Politics in Spires, and to share any thoughts or comments with our editorial team at oxbridge.blog@gmail.com.

www.politicsinspires.org

SPECIAL SERIES

An editorial series that explores the evolving nature of the social movements that were sparked in the Middle East in 2010. Combining work by scholars and practitioners based in Oxford and beyond, the series has published articles that explore how the revolutions have affected the economic, political, and social outlook of nations in the region, including Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt and Yemen.

Politics in Spires is launching a new series in which contributors are invited to review recent books written by Oxford academics. This series hopes to encourage greater cross-divisional engagement of the Oxford graduate community with the work of the university's top academics.

A British Academy-funded research project, currently being run at Kellogg College's Centre for Mutual and Employee-Owned Business, aims to explore these questions and develop a framework for evaluating cooperative and mutual performance. The research team would like to know what you think of their ideas.

Alumni Weekend 2014

19 – 21 September 2014

We invite you to come back to Oxford this September to enjoy being part of our eighth annual Alumni Weekend in the city. This three-day programme of academic sessions will challenge you to think about global issues from a new perspective, allowing you to learn about recent developments in a field that interests you. You will have the opportunity to engage your peers in debate during the many social events which are built into the programme. DPIR's participation in the event is outlined below. Full details of the weekend can be found at

www.alumniweekend.ox.ac.uk

Saturday 20 September 2014
Maths Institute, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter

10:00am – 11:15am
Climate Change in the Media
James Painter, Head of the Journalism Fellowship Programme, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Department of Politics and International Relations

The variety of ways the media represent the science of climate change is now a widely researched area, but it remains a bitterly disputed one. Do climate sceptics get too much coverage? Does the growth in online sites, including sceptical ones, enhance the public's understanding, or diminish it? Do journalists do a good job in capturing the complexity and uncertainties around climate change, and can climate scientists do a better job in dealing with the media? James Painter is an author and journalist, and was senior editor at the BBC World Service for 15 years.

2:30pm – 3:45pm
The Ties that Unbind: Between the Scotland and the EU Referenda
Professor Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Professor of International Relations and Fellow of St Antony's
Dr Scot Peterson, Bingham Research Fellow in Constitutional Studies and Fellow of Balliol

On 18 September 2014 Scottish residents will vote on whether to dissolve the Union of the Parliaments of England and Wales and Scotland, which has existed since 1707. If the voters decide in favour of dissolution, many questions will have to be answered in the months before independence. If Scotland votes to stay in the United Kingdom, a different chain of events is set in motion in relation to the general election in 2015, the EU referendum and the UK's membership in Europe. Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Scot Peterson will discuss these questions just two days after this historic vote.

Booking is via the University Alumni website and brochure
www.alumniweekend.ox.ac.uk
Booking closes Friday 30 August 2014

DPIR ALUMNI EVENT

Saturday 29 November 2014

Political Economy in Times of Crisis

Please join political economists in the Department of Politics and International Relations for a conference on Saturday 29 November, 'Political Economy in Times of Crisis'.

A team of Oxford academics will present some of their latest thinking on the challenges that face Europe today, including the future of the welfare state, immigration and diversity, the importance of political institutions, the relationship between democratisation and growth, etc. They will address how political choices and institutions shape the economy, and in turn, how economic actors and events shape public policy. The conference will be followed by a dinner at Pembroke College.

Full details will be available shortly at **www.politics.ox.ac.uk**