Louis W. Pauly, University of Toronto
Insurance as Global Governance: Entanglements and Aspirations at the Risk Frontier
Of the sectors comprising global capital markets, insurance has received relatively little attention from scholars of international politics. New social conventions and financial instruments arising from the invention of probabilistic reasoning and the discovery of risk began to spread around the world only a few centuries ago. They disciplined speculative impulses, promoted economic development and integration, and fostered political transformation and societal resilience. Over time, the logic and language of insurance proved useful in defending and expanding the fiscal authority of the state as well as in justifying the pooling of sovereignty in nascent federations. On this point, pioneering research in the field of political sociology demonstrated how the insurance industry had come in the modern era to function as a key instrument of governance in industrial and post-industrial societies, which effectively resulted in the assignment of priority to market-liberal over other social values. During the twentieth century, leading states appealed to the logic of risk mutualization and insurance as they designed some of the institutional architecture of regional and global economic order. Limited co-insurance facilities were supplemented at points of emergency by massive ad hoc reinsurance arrangements combining private as well as public interests and resources. Today, the very idea of such policy instruments attracts mounting resistance. When the siren song of self-reliance once again rings out from the governments of states overwhelmed by populist and mercantilist pressures, the risks of systemic fragmentation grow. At the same time, the causes of fairness and sustainability appear to be in retreat around the world. In such a context, and especially at the frontier where evident global risks meet mounting uncertainty, it is worth thinking more deeply and pragmatically about the ways in which new forms of insurance might help promote global stability and distributive justice. The paper provides summary notes on Lou’s latest book, Insuring States in an Uncertain World: Towards the Collaborative Government of Complex Risks, Cambridge University Press, 2025.
Krzysztof Pelc, University of Oxford, Department of Politics and International Relations
Self-Binding for Souls and States
Binding institutions such as constitutions and international treaties are commonly justified as responses to political passions: they restrain future governments against short-term temptation. At the individual level, rational actors who recognize their own susceptibility to temptation are likewise expected to seek out commitment devices that constrain their future choices. This article asks whether these intuitions align in practice. Are individuals who experience intrapersonal conflict more attuned to political time-inconsistency? And does such awareness translate into greater support for institutional constraint? Drawing on an original survey conducted in the US and UK (n=3,428), I show that inner conflict and attitudes towards political self-binding are indeed linked—but in a strikingly inverted way. Individuals who report greater intrapersonal conflict are systematically less supportive of self-imposed rules, regulatory interventions, constitutional constraints, and binding international agreements. Far from generating demand for commitment, greater reported weakness of will appears to undermine it. Retrospective regret is a stronger (negative) predictor of support for political self-binding than perceptions of political temptation itself. Experimental evidence further reveals a directional linkage between the self and the state. Priming intrapersonal conflict increases recognition of political time-inconsistency, while the reverse does not hold. Together, these findings challenge a foundational assumption in political economy—that insight into temptation produces demand for commitment—and raise questions about the democratic foundations of institutional self-binding.
Jörg Friedrichs, University of Oxford, Department of International Development
An Infrastructure View of AI Governance
Artificial intelligence (AI) is as disruptive as any other technology that has unleashed an industrial revolution, from steam engines to automobiles and from electromagnetism to computing. Unsurprisingly, therefore, governance and regulation are lagging behind. In past industrial revolutions, they have similarly lagged behind but came into their own when the technologies in question entered the infrastructure stage. We explore how and why, in past industrial revolutions, governance and regulation have coincided with the infrastructure stage. We should expect the same for the fourth industrial revolution, which is commonly associated with the advent of artificial intelligence. AI has already become highly infrastructural, as exemplified by data centers and cloud computing, which necessitate access to optical fiber networks and abundant power generation. Open-source platforms are another significant case in point. All of this offers ample opportunities for governance and regulation. Given its pragmatic approach, China is already pursuing these opportunities. Decision makers in the West and elsewhere should also take an infrastructure view of AI governance.
Jai Bhatia, University of Oxford, Department of International Development
Digital Public Infrastructure and Global Governance: Opportunities, Risks, and the Indian Model
Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) refers to foundational, interoperable digital systems such as digital identity, payments, and data exchange layers that enable governments, businesses, and citizens to interact efficiently and inclusively. Increasingly recognized as a cornerstone of modern state capacity, DPI is being adopted or explored by over 50 countries, with strong endorsement from multilateral institutions such as the G20, World Bank, and UN. Its rapid diffusion signals a structural shift, as DPI emerges not just as a technological upgrade but as a governance paradigm shaping how states deliver services, regulate economies, and exercise authority in the digital age.
This paper draws on India as a central case study to examine the evolution and implications of DPI. India’s “India Stack,” particularly Aadhaar and the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), illustrates both the scale and transformative potential of such systems. Aadhaar has enrolled over a billion individuals, enabling streamlined access to welfare and public services, while UPI has reshaped retail payments by processing billions of transactions monthly at minimal cost. Together, these platforms illustrate how DPI can reconfigure state capacity and authority, raising critical governance questions around data control, regulatory oversight, and accountability, particularly as they extend beyond national borders through cross-border payment linkages and international partnerships. At the same time, insufficient governance risks accelerating the financialisation of everyday life, where fintech actors leverage DPI rails to aggressively market credit, loans, and financial products, potentially exacerbating indebtedness, consumer vulnerability, and systemic risk in the absence of robust regulatory safeguards. These dynamics highlight broader governance challenges. DPI concentrates control over data, identity, and financial flows, raising concerns around surveillance, privacy, exclusion, and cybersecurity, while its global diffusion is reconfiguring the financial landscape, as emerging systems challenge entrenched networks and advance competing visions of digital sovereignty within an increasingly multipolar order. The paper argues that robust governance frameworks are essential to ensure that DPI remains inclusive, secure, and accountable. As DPI becomes embedded in global systems, its governance will shape not only economic outcomes but also the future balance between state power, individual rights, and international cooperation.
