In weak-state settings, clientelism is an attractive political strategy, yet normatively fraught, thereby constituting a “legal grey area”. This study examines two key features of commonplace clientelism that may govern whether and to what extent citizens deem it punishable by the law. We posit a “particularism penalty” – more exclusive targeting criteria increase citizens’ desired punishment, and an “outgroup actor penalty” - preferred punishment is greater for political opponents. In a survey experiment with Kikuyus and Luos in Kenya, randomizing these features in a range of commonplace clientelist actions, we find support for both hypotheses and an interaction effect. Respondents prefer more punishment for elites’ actions targeting core supporters – co-ethnics or co-partisans – versus unspecified people, with small differences between co-ethnic and co-partisan targeting. However, most of the aggregate results are driven by elected officials’ favoritism in public service delivery or verbal appeals, rather than favoritism in the judicial sector or electoral exchanges. At the same time, respondents systematically prefer more punishment for ethno-partisan opponents, and more so for higher-level officials. This paper highlights that normative views towards clientelist actions are diverse, but characterized by a general disdain for any actors who more exclusively favor their base, even as citizens remain more lenient towards ingroup perpetrators.
