A growing literature shows that democratic institutions, particularly elections, are associated with higher deforestation. To enhance our understanding of the mechanisms driving this relationship, we study the link between the electoral backlash to environmental protection, the incumbents' electoral needs and the behavior of environmental bureaucracies. We argue and show that bureaucratic enforcement follows a politico-economic logic. In response to backlash by voters and producers, politicians strategically alter the implementation of environmental policy, selectively withholding enforcement where expected political costs are highest. Political costs are higher in districts with both electoral value and high extractive potential after deforestation. This creates systematic gaps in enforcement, weakening deterrence and increasing future deforestation. We test this argument in the Brazilian Amazon, tracing step by step the process from backlash to strategic enforcement and, ultimately, environmental outcomes. Strategic enforcement emerges as an important driver of further deforestation. Our findings offer a nuanced understanding of how politics shape environmental outcomes and suggest ways to design more resilient environmental policies.
