Join us for an academic talk by Professor Alexandre Debs which discusses his ongoing academic research. In this talk, Professor Debs presents arguments from his working paper which asks: how could power imbalance lead to war? Some argue that power preponderance causes war by undermining the credibility of assurances. Others contend instead that non-credible assurances are inconsequential, fueling future negotiations without affecting the conditions for war. In simple game-theoretic models, Professor Debs concludes that non-credible assurances do not per se cause conflict, but that power imbalance may nevertheless cause conflict through another mechanism. In an unbalanced dyad, a weak target fears that it may not survive the initial engagement and it is willing to sue for peace under unfavorable terms. The strong party is then incentivized to press its advantage, increasing the risk of conflict. In this talk, Professor Debs discusses how this model sheds light on prominent cases.
Biography of the Speaker: Alexandre Debs is a Professor of Political Science and is the Faculty Director of the Nuclear Security Program at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University. He obtained his PhD in Economics from MIT, his MPhil in Economic and Social History from the University of Oxford, and his BSc in Economics and Mathematics from the Universite de Montreal. His research discusses the causes of war, nuclear proliferation, and democratization. He is the author of the book "Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation", co-written with Nuno Monteiro and published by Cambridge University Press.
