All great powers require steady access to oil to maintain their security, yet they pursue wildly different strategies to obtain it. In some cases, great powers have fought wars for oil, while in other instances, they have allied with oil-exporting countries or simply built strategic petroleum stockpiles to secure supplies. Two causal factors determine the choice of strategy: a state's petroleum deficit and the vulnerability of its oil imports to forcible disruption.

Neither China nor the United States might be willing to risk nuclear war to achieve their limited political aims in future conflicts over Taiwan, North Korea, or disputed maritime territories. US leaders might therefore opt for a naval blockade of Chinese merchant shipping to coerce China to end a future limited war, judging that a blockade poses a lower risk of nuclear escalation than conventional strikes on the Chinese mainland and lower costs than directly engaging Chinese air and naval forces off China’s shores.

Conor O’Neill joined the Royal Navy in 1999 as a University Cadet (Warfare). He read Modern History and Politics at Wadham College, Oxford and completed at Masters in 2004. Following Fleet Navigating Officer’s Course in 2007, he joined HMS CUMBERLAND, then HMS CHATHAM, deploying to the Arabian Gulf in 2008 on Operation TELIC. Having returned to the UK, he served on the staff of Flag Officer Sea Training (Mine Warfare and Patrol Vessels) as a navigation sea-rider before assuming Command of HMS TRACKER and Oxford URNU in September 2009.

The most likely friction points between China and the United States are located at sea. It is not clear that existing security studies scholarship—based on territorial, nuclear, and civil conflict—applies comfortably to the maritime domain. As one example, a “denialist” school in security studies argues that counterintervention technology makes defense dominant in the region. Nonetheless, the US Navy remains a fleet designed for an offensive approach of power projection and sea control.