This paper will examine the US-UK relationship through the prism of two key military interventions in the Middle East after the Suez debacle; Jordan in 1958 and Kuwait in 1961. It will argue that the 1956 crisis led the UK to acknowledge that its international power was in decline and that future interventions in the region would always require American acquiescence. Having learned these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan endeavoured to use Jordan and Kuwait as a means to realign US-UK policy in the region, believing that he could use US means for UK ends. 

This paper will investigate the US and UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with a focus on the longer-term adjustment of policies triggered by this event. Numerous scholars have studied the immediate reaction to the invasion, for example focusing on the tough rhetorical criticism of Moscow, the economic sanctions, and the boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games. However, less attention has been devoted to studying the broader significance of the strategic choices made by Washington and London in the aftermath of the Soviet action.

This seminar will held in person as usual and will not be affected by the UCU strike.