We exhibit a voting method for elections that is resistant to strategic voting and elects the majority winner (i.e., the Condorcet winner) when voters’ preferences over candidates are single-peaked, meaning that a voter prefers candidates closer to her in ideology to those further away. Moreover, we show that this system is essentially the unique strategy-resistant method among all voting systems satisfying anonymity (equal treatment of voters) and neutrality (equal treatment of candidates) for single-peaked preferences.

This talk reconceptualizes Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics ('Xi Thought') not as a coherent doctrine but as a rhizomatic ideological formation. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, it treats Xi Thought as a configuration in which coherence is not presupposed but produced through the continual recombination of fragments across institutional sites. Based on an analysis of official publications, including collected works, excerpt volumes, and study readers, Prof.